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Abstract
Character studies have long been shaped by the dominant critical methods arising during
different periods of criticism. The structuralists, in the 1970s, transposed character from being
understood as psychologically constructed to a mere linguistic effect of the text—an agent
controlled by narrative function, event analysis, and syntactical categories. Barthes, together with
Todorov and Greimas, proposed that narrative analysis no longer rely on character; character was
in fact disposable. Guided by the terms flatness, distortion, nonsense, and the ordinary, this thesis
will examine the character’s presence as its own thematic aspect of the text rather than as a
symptom of it through novels such as Bolaño’s The Savage Detectives, O’Brien’s The Third
Policeman, and Bernhard’s The Loser. Each of these texts plays with representation of the
ordinary, sometimes privileging it and sometimes removing it entirely, resulting in a nonsensical
narrative. Over 40 characters narrate journal entries in The Savage Detectives, each one of them
unessential or minimal to the immediate development of the text, per Barthes; yet to throw any
one of them away would be to lose or alter the meaning of the novel. That we often take for
granted that narratives are unrealistic, exaggerating the richness of “life,” indulges in a distortion
that, once removed, reveals flatness. The distorted and sometimes fantastical postmodern worlds
of these narratives shoulder a purposeful absurdity present in literature that interrogating
character lays bare.
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Introduction
E.M. Forster’s description of the breakfast he was served on an early-morning boat train
to London in the 1930s illustrates his propensity for pairing opposites:
“Porridge or prunes, sir?” That cry still rings in my memory. It is an epitome—not,
indeed, of English food, but of the forces that drag it into the dirt. It voices the true spirit
of gastronomic joylessness. Porridge fills the Englishman up, prunes clear him out, so
their functions are opposed.1
In one of the most foundational character studies from 1927, E.M. Forster created two categories
of characters, flat and round, that have influenced, angered, and provoked endless commentary in
character studies. Round characters, according to Forster, are the “real” ones who undergo
development and change. A round character must be “capable of surprising in a convincing way”
and must have “the incalculability of life about it—life within the pages of a book” (Forster 4).
Here, Forster, linking surprise with “realness,” espouses that a mimetic character must be
surprising because surprise or “incalculability” is the most recognizable and convincing aspect of
human life. He defines round characters in contrast with flat characters, who “in their purest
form, […] are constructed round a single idea or quality” and “each can be expressed in a single
sentence” (1). When characters cannot easily be contained by a single sentence or factor, “we get
the beginning of the curve towards the round” (1). Forster posits several examples of both flat
and round characters across works from Proust and Dickens among others, like Mrs. Micawber
who “says she won’t desert Mr. Micawber, she doesn’t, and there she is,” (1) (at least under

1

Barnes, Julian. “I Was Wrong about E.M. Forster.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 2 Dec. 2016,
www.theguardian.com/books/2016/dec/02/julian-barnes-i-was-wrong-about-em-forster.
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Forster’s analysis), but he also denotes a “test” by which to understand which characters are flat
and which are round. A round character must, as previously stated, surprise the reader “in a
convincing way. If it never surprises, it is flat. If it does not convince, it is a flat pretending to be
round” (4). This test moves Forster’s theory of character away from character itself and toward a
theory of the novel; the very idea of round characters, and their opposite, flat characters,
communicates two different journeys that have to do with sustaining narrative rather than just
understanding the psychology of the characters themselves. Forster’s interpretation puts weight
on how we, as readers, interpret characters and how we fictionalize “human beings,” in what
altered manner they move a narrative forward.
Recent character studies have shifted from the strict dichotomy imposed by Forster and
moved toward what Forster’s dichotomy implies, that we look to character as a basis for
explaining narrative development. Flat and Round Characters becomes the basis for critics such
as Baruch Hochman in Character in Literature (1985) to define characters by a series of scales
ranging from transparent to opaque or literalness to the symbolic. Alex Woloch’s The One vs.
The Many describes characters in a matrix of time and space within the novel, arguing that how
much space they take up, how much they deserve, and how much pressure these characters put
on narrative coherence, regulates the novel. But despite its evolution, Forster’s archetypes of flat
and round characters continue to pervade character analyses as the means to mark one or the
other of these types. Assessing the field of criticism after Forster and in particular, reacting to the
claims of New Criticism, Stanley Cavell in “The Avoidance of Love” (Must We Mean What We
Say? (1967) notes the critical shift away from the study of character as recognizable persons
toward the study and emphasis on how the words of characters represent and fix meaning in
literary fictions. Why is this so? Critics have become increasingly skeptical that characters are
6

people, and the fullness of what we know about people cannot be known about characters;
consequently, the complexity with which we know people cannot be operative or easily
transferred when we examine characters. This shift has resulted in characters often being read as
symptoms of or distractions from the “final evidence for a reading of a literary work,” which are
the words themselves.
The early split in critical consciousness appearing in the first half of the 20th century is
paradigmatic today of two broad theoretical approaches: as mimetic theories present, characters
are equated with real human persons who are engaging in an intelligibly “human” world,
whereas in semiotic theories, under the aegis of action, characters elide into forms and
figurations of the text. In the current, postmodern climate, readers turn to literature for answers to
increasingly complex questions, often reading with the concept of identification in mind. Yet the
experimental novel of today, in turn, moves away from this notion of establishing a
correspondence theory of truth through narrative. For instance, in Flann O’Brien’s The Third
Policeman, readers find themselves in a story told from the perspective of an unnamed narrator
who is aware of his anonymity, accompanied by his soul named Joe. The world around him
slowly dissolves into nonsense as he interacts with bicycle-humans and policeman playing
invisible instruments, which cease to communicate recognizable referents to the world of the
reader. Yet, during the text and afterwards, it remains tempting to read the narrator as a “real
person.” How should critics then handle this character? Does Forster’s taxonomy of flat and
round characters still pertain? How and why does an inhabitant of a nonsensical world still “feel
real?”
This thesis undertakes a study of character in the postmodern novel to attempt to
reconcile the difficulty of our emotionally identifying with a character and the necessary distance
7

we perceive that exists between character and real person. Always holding a character in our
mind as “not a real being” changes our reading of a novel significantly. Character studies have
long been shaped by these types of questions with dominant critical methods arising during
different periods of criticism. Even as far back as 1933 when L.C. Knights launched his
infamous attack on A.C. Bradley in How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?, literary criticism
has devalued placing weight on the reality of characters, particularly any attempts to
sentimentalize them, instead favoring language, aesthetics, and thematics. The structuralists in
the 1970s, transposed the analysis of character from being psychologically constructed to a mere
effect of the text—an agent controlled by narrative function, event analysis, and syntactical
categories. Barthes, together with Todorov and Greimas, proposed that narrative analysis no
longer rely on character; character was in fact disposable. As Blakey Vermeule puts it in her text,
Why Do We Care about Literary Characters, “theorists have long fashioned themselves as
crusaders against the pleasures and dangers of literary absorption, reacting suspiciously to the
ordinary pleasures people take in fictional characters, replying to fiction’s barbaric yawp with a
stentorian no!” (Vermeule 16).
Vermeule, who writes mainly about literary gossip in eighteenth-century novels, poses
questions like my own. Why care about literary characters, and why are theorists so against our
caring? The dominant paradigms of character study are split between a cognitive psychology/
Theory of Mind perspective with authors like Vermeule, as well as Lisa Zunshine and her text
Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (2006), and a narratological perspective,
advanced early on by practitioners of poetics. Critics like Zunshine use knowledge of the mind,
derived from cognitive psychology, to explain the interactions between reader and text, and how
a reader’s understanding of real life and real people can alter their understanding of character.
8

Rimmon-Kenan, a poetics-sympathetic theorist, links character analysis to linguistic structures
and reading strategies.
I am most interested in what Vermeule calls the “ordinary pleasures people take in
fictional characters,” using “ordinary” as a critical term—in the Cavellian sense. But in my
opinion these texts are anything but pleasurable, as I find myself agreeing with Lanta Davis who
writes of The Third Policeman, “Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman seems to relish sending
its reader through hell” (Davis 341). Being about half-bicycle humans and boxes that fit inside
each other getting infinitely smaller, like matryoshka dolls, O’Brien’s hellish landscape certainly
challenges a reader trying to grasp any sense of reality. However, as this thesis will demonstrate,
Roberto Bolaño’s The Savage Detectives’ Garcia Madero narrates an equally hellish story—
being chased by murderous pimps and desperately searching for the elusive Cesárea Tinajero
who may not exist. Even Thomas Bernhard’s The Loser is not exempt from producing a
psychologically tense, claustrophobic narrative that clearly tortures some readers. Is there a
pleasure, then, in reading these texts? A cathartic sense of relief upon the end of the narrative? If
there is, character creates both the tension and relief related to the pleasure of these deeply unpleasurable texts.
Both readers and critics alike take for granted the notion that literature contracts and
expands, exaggerates and diminishes, to create coherent narrative. Even the most “realistic”
narratives assemble and enlarge aspects of life to which an “ordinary person” would pay no
attention. Now, in postmodern literature where realism holds little or no value, rounded
characters mean nothing—as flat characters move to the forefront. Ironically, the flat character
becomes the “ordinary person,” the type whose signifying lively features reappear in a plenitude
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of novels. Consider what James Wood writes in How Fiction Works as deviating strongly from
Forster’s ideas about character,
A great deal of nonsense is written every day about characters in fiction—from the side
of those who believe in character too much and from the side of those who believe too
little. […] But to repeat, what is a character? I am thicketed in qualifications: if I say that
a character seems connected to consciousness, to the use of a mind, the many superb
examples of characters who seem to think very little, who are rarely seen thinking, bristle
up (Gatsby, Captain Ahab, Becky Sharp, Widmerpool, Jean Brodie). If I refine the
thought by repeating that character at least has some essential connection to an interior
life, to inwardness, is seen “from within,” I am presented with the nicely opposing
examples of those two adulterers, Anna Karenina and Effi Briest, the first of whom does
a lot of reflection, and is seen internally as well as externally, the second of whom, in
Theodor Fontane’s eponymous novel, is seen almost entirely from the outside, with little
space set aside for represented reflection. No one could say that Anna is more vivid that
Effi simply because we see Anna doing more thinking. If I try to distinguish between
major and minor characters—round and flat characters—and claim that these differ in
terms of subtlety, depth, time allowed on the page, I must concede that many so-called
flat characters seem more alive to me, and more interesting as human studies, however
short-lived, than the round characters they are supposedly subservient to (Wood 95-99).
Wood’s preference for so-called flat characters prefigures ideas put forward in Marta
Figlerowicz’s Flat Protagonists: A Theory of Novel Character, that flat characters can appear
more alive, more interesting as “human studies.”

10

Marta Figlerowicz, in her text contends that a protagonist may be regarded as flat and
defines the term “flat protagonist” as “characters whose represented self-expression and ties to
others contract and simplify over the course of a novel […] [tending] asymptotically toward what
E.M, Forster describes as “flat” character construction,” but are protagonists nonetheless (3).
According to Figlerowicz, a flat protagonist is a means by which to represent a sense of personal
finitude. What is usually construed as the novel’s weakness (an inability to represent the richness
of “real life”), she regards as this text’s strength, suggesting that this finitude is necessary to
communicate the idea that the human experience is equally as unfulfilling as a novel—that one’s
own interpersonal relationships may be “extremely partial and narrow when one compares them
[..] to the diversity and breadth of one’s surrounding social networks” (5-6). In her analysis of
chosen texts, including Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, she examines the vast indifference of
society in which any one character, or person, exists.
Wood seems to be on the verge of suggesting, as Figlerowicz does, that flat characters are
like us, like the reader, like the ordinary person. The many examples Wood uses to try and sort
through the “nonsense” written about characters in fiction helps to make clear the difficulty in
sorting out the parts of character to which a reader or critic must pay attention. Figlerowicz’s
work follows then by reconciling the notion that flatness and realness are distinctly different
factors of character, suggesting instead that the flat character signifies to a reader something
about themselves. Flatness, in this context, becomes realness. My own work extends her analysis
and seeks to discover under what conditions character functions in narrative, how narrative
controls character, and how character controls narrative. The terms which I develop, distortion,
nonsense, and the ordinary, all fall under the umbrella term, flatness, but in the sense of
Figlerowicz’s work—a flatness that undercuts the exaggerated sense of reality that earlier novels
11

have given us. This thesis will examine the narrators of Thomas Bernhard’s The Loser, Flann
O’Brien’s The Third Policeman, and Roberto Bolaño’s The Savage Detectives, novels which I
will call postmodern novels and remain relatively untouched by character studies. I attempt to
discover what makes a character life-like and what makes character an agent of the text, and
ultimately, how these distinctions drive our interpretive understanding of the text.
Figlerowicz, solely focusing on Proust’s narrator as the flat protagonist of his own
narrative, even though his thoughts about M. Swann in Volume I model the deconstruction of
character in literary texts, develops a multi-faceted account of M. Swann. In the text’s own voice
there was “no doubt” that “the Swann who was known at the same time to so many clubmen was
quite different than the one created by my great-aunt,” the Swann whom “they had formed for
themselves” (Proust 19). Swann, in effect, invites a multi-faceted person explanation, with
different layers of identity known to different groups of people. Yet the narrator also says,
Even with respect to the most insignificant things in life, none of us constitutes a material
whole, identical for everyone, which a person has only to go look up as though we were a
book of specifications or a last testament; our social personality is a creation of the minds
of others. Even the very simple act that we call ‘seeing a person we know’ is in part an
intellectual one. We fill the physical appearance of the individual we see with all the
notions we have about him, and of the total picture that we form for ourselves (19).
What the narrator wrestles with here is parallel to establishing what one means by “flat” and
“round” characters. Employing these distinctions permits us to refer directly to the psychological
construction of a character—the dimensionality of their mind—or to detect the absence of it, our
being occluded from what might not be there. Alternatively, we might view the narrator as
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suggesting that all “people” are flat; no person is a “material whole,” filled out fully by the
signified, but are instead an assemblage of signifiers— his “aquiline nose,” the swell of his
cheeks, the “sonority of his voice”—that move away from physicality to abstraction (19). The
intellectual act in which we engage as the reader/ viewer of another person is to create depth out
of singular characteristics—we “form” and “create” depth ourselves. Thus, the Swann known to
the narrator and his family is not the same Swann known by gentlemen from the club, and
perhaps consequently is not Swann at all. His simple presence makes him “round” because of the
composite psychological narrative of those around him.
In her chapter on Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, “The Solipsist,” Figlerowicz comments
on the heightened cultural interest in first-person narrative and of the renewed belief in the value
of its representation. Citing James’ The Art of Fiction, “humanity is immense and reality has a
myriad of forms […] experience is never limited, and it is never complete; it is an immense
sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threats suspended in the chamber of
consciousness” (Figlerowicz 130). To James and other authors of this period, writes Figlerowicz,
“literature is valuable to the extent that it is able to awe its reader with depictions of this
‘immense sensibility,’ and to convey it with as much depth and commitment as possible” (130).
Proust’s narrator most decidedly conveys the richness and depth of first-person “sensations”
throughout the novel, but he also interrogates the centrality of these experiences. He discovers,
like Figlerowicz suggests, that perhaps the sensations confined to his own mind and body are
uninteresting to anyone else (131).
Taking up as much narrative space as he can possibly have, Proust’s narrator
communicates only the finitude of his own person—as Figerlowicz suggests, “how the
seemingly rich, totalizing worlds of feelings and sensations in which he immerses himself might
13

only be confined to his own mind and body—and, as such, they might be uninteresting to anyone
else” (130). Despite what may seem like a wealth of psychological knowledge about the narrator,
he remains a “flat protagonist.” I would like to retain this idea of the Proust narrator that “none
of us constitutes a material whole, identical for everyone, which a person has only to go look up
as though we were a book of specifications.” The idea of being a “material whole,” per Marcel,
seems more akin to Forster’s definition of “flat” than “round,” despite being defined as a
“whole.” Being “whole” here refers to being fully knowable—found in a “book of
specifications.”
The idea that something, or someone, can be fully knowable is a great comfort to the
reader, for knowing something fully means one can speak about the subject without worry or
with the confidence of intimacy, with precision (as Forster does with Mrs. Micawber). The
narrators within the novels of Bernhard, O’Brien, and Bolaño fall prey to these same comforts of
knowability. They cling to their knowledge with an almost maniacal force, refusing to abandon it
for any reason. When these narrators find that they do not know something, the narrative
undergoes a shift toward the nonsensical for several reasons. It is possible that the narrator’s
knowledge is no longer compatible with their narrative environment, as with O’Brien’s narrator,
or perhaps the narrator believes his knowledge to be somewhat of a secret—applicable only to
himself, and not to the rest of the ordinary people in the world, like in The Loser. This secret,
superior knowledge results in the reader’s own feeling of nonsense, suggesting that their ordinary
life which Bernhard’s narrator so looks down upon may be under assault.
For Forster, the fact that a flat character can be known fully, recognized at once by the
reader as a static object of the text, is a necessity in how he experiences literature. His separation
of flat and round characters conveys the idea that the whole world cannot be round, some
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characters must be incidental—flat—in order to have inflated, round, life-like characters.
Bolaño’s narrative plays with this notion by inflating a myriad number of characters through
interviews in Part II of The Savage Detectives, disturbing and upsetting the dichotomy that
Forster suggests helps literature cohere. For example, when looking for characters that can be
considered flat by Forster’s standards in The Savage Detectives, we examine Barbara Patterson.
Barbara Patterson, the American girlfriend of Rafael Barrios—one of the visceral realists—
functions as a paradigmatically “minor” character. Though her name appears in several of Garcia
Madero’s journal entries, nothing exists of her character. In fact, Garcia Madero writes her full
name in every entry she appears in, as though not to forget who he is talking about—or, perhaps
for Bolaño, to turn her into the fullness of both names for the reader. Garcia Madero introduces
her saying, “Barrios showed up arm in arm with a very nice American girl (she was always
smiling) whose name was Barbara Patterson” (94). When Xóchitl wants to smoke weed despite
being pregnant, Barbara delivers her only line throughout Part I, “let her smoke if she wants, said
Barbara Patterson” (193). Through the eyes of Garcia Madero, Barbara Patterson is an irrelevant
player, a nice American girl who smiles often. Despite this apparent perception, in Part II, she is
interviewed three times.
Barbara Patterson, in a room at the Hotel Los Claveles, Avenida Niño Perdido and Juan
de Dios Peza, Mexico City DF, September 1976.
Motherfucking hemorrhoid-licking old bastard, I saw the distrust in his pale, bored little
monkey eyes right from the start, and I said to myself this asshole will take every chance
he gets to spit on me, the motherfucking son of a bitch (181).
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From her own testimony, Barbara becomes entangled with the visceral realists after
falling in love-at-first-sight with Rafael at a poetry reading, then following the “gang” to their
gatherings and various exploits, forming loose friendships with the visceral realists. Here,
Barbara speaks about interviewing Manuel Maples Arce with Rafael, Requena, and Belano.
Throughout her interview, Barbara calls Maples Arce an “old fart-breath,” a “constipated grand
old man of Mexican literature,” and “Mr. Great Poet of the Pleistocene” (182). Where once
Garcia Madero perceived her as quiet and smiling, her words present her as angry. In fact, she
says in a later interview (in her home in San Diego in 1982), “I was seething with rage, I really
was, absolute fury” (365). Anger, as an overarching identifier, encompasses being foul-mouthed,
resentful, and sardonic. These qualities follow Barbara as identifiers throughout her interviews,
allowing a reader comfortably to say Barbara can be “summarized” as a character in one
sentence, around one idea.
However, the difference between Garcia Madero’s Barbara Patterson, and the words
attributed to Barbara Patterson, trouble the intuition that she is flat. Perhaps this difference
signifies the unreliability of Garcia Madero’s narration/ journal entries. His obsession with
Belano, Lima, and the rest of the visceral realists blinds him to the character of others. Garcia
Madero’s Barbara Patterson appears to be the Mrs. Micawber of his story—she is with Rafael
and she smiles, that is all. Yet surely one would concede that Garcia Madero’s description of
Barbara is sorely lacking. Part of the interest in flat characters, part of the way in which we want
to claim that they are not “real people,” is that we want to be able to claim the character is fully
knowable. With Part II in the forefront, we can say we know, from her own testimony, that
Barbara Patterson is “always angry” and “always foul-mouthed,” but if this were true Garcia
Madero would have certainly made note of her abusive language in his mentions of her. By
16

presenting Barbara Patterson in Part II, along with several other minor characters, some of whom
appear in Part I and some of whom only appear in interview form, the narrative breathes life,
psychological life, into every character mentioned. They are all the protagonists of their own
lives, nearly invisible lives, though they are not all of equal importance to Garcia Madero.
Garcia Madero’s unintentional ignorance of Barbara Patterson in his journal entries
appears somewhere on a critical continuum that spans the explanations of Forster and
Figlerowicz. The interviews of Part II seem to remind the reader that, as Figlerowicz suggests, no
one person can represent the richness of life and the breadth of social interaction that can occur
in life, nor can one person truly take up as much space in the minds of others as they think they
do. For example, even though Barbara Patterson goes on a tirade about the disgusting, old
Manuel Maples Arce, and how he will take every chance he can to spit on her, Arce rarely
mentions her in his own interview. He notes that she is American and perhaps does not know
very well the works of Borges and John Dos Passos. Of course, Arce’s mention of Barbara’s
ignorance can certainly be interpreted as a sort of slight to her intelligence; her interview gives
the impression that Arce was attempting to single her out, looking at her distrustfully, “spitting”
on her (metaphorically, of course). These two interviews side-by-side extend Figlerowicz
analysis even further, in that one’s subjectivity influences the way certain events are viewed and
subsequently portrayed. For Forster, inflating the perspectives of Barbara and Manuel Maples
Arce may push the narrative toward a certain incoherence—too many inflated characters, too
much “life.”
Ironically, Forster and Figlerowicz perhaps represent two sides of the same coin. She
argues that we learn more about ourselves from a character that is flat, which is somehow akin to
the learning process that comes to Forster through the round character. Neither critic wants to
17

give up the notion that we learn from characters. We read literature to be moved by characters, to
figure out their complexity, or we read and see characters that lack complexity and therefore
remind us of ourselves. Both Forster and Figlerowicz hang their arguments on a sense of
imagining, though they imagine two different scenarios as the outcome for studying characters.
The interviews in The Savage Detectives and the way they inflate and deflate characters
returns to the terms under which this thesis examines character—through distortion, nonsense,
and ordinariness. The interviews make clear that time, space, and character can be distorted to
make room for other events (as it is with the journals of Garcia Madero), and how this distortion
can lead into a nonsensical, incoherent narrative—or at least a narrative that alienates its reader.
Ordinary, then, is what these characters really are, as Figlerowicz suggests. The ordinary
character is like the reader, their understanding of the world around them cannot possibly
communicate the true richness of life, of reality, because their minds focus on what they deem
important. What becomes inflated throughout the course of a novel, then, represents the personal
finitude of both character and reader, illustrating certain aspects of life that the character views as
important rather than a rich picture of life as it is.
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Chapter 1: Sense and Nonsense
Traditional readings of The Savage Detectives and The Loser prefer to search for deeper,
social, historical meanings that look outside of these novels for answers. Ordinarily, these
readings are reliant on the texts themselves for evidence, yet the meaning of the text is not
contained in the meanings of their specific words but instead relies on something about “life,” or
poetry or music or art, and so forth. My reading redirects our attention to the “obvious,” to look
for the sense and coherence internal to the words of these texts. I take my methodological cue
from John Attridge’s reading of The Third Policeman, wherein he discusses the approach to
nonsense developed in the 1930s and 40s by ordinary language philosophers like Ludwig
Wittgenstein, after Tractatus (although Cavell would take issue with calling Wittgenstein an
ordinary language philosopher), and J.L. Austin because of their pertinence to our understanding
of O’Brien’s literary nonsense “not only for what it reveals about his literary technique, but also
for the light it sheds on his cultural historical positioning as a novelist writing in the immediate
aftermath of high modernism” (Attridge 299). I further his argument by applying Gricean
conversational logic and mechanics to sketch out a sense of the “nonsensical” phrases and
conditions of the novel. My purpose here specifically borrows from H.P Grice’s contention that
people or characters break the rules or “flout” the social conventions of conversations. Peering
into these “flouts” in postmodern and unconventional narratives, we begin to discover the basis
of nonsensical speech, not as intentional exploitations but rather as creative fictional distortions
of ordinary speech.
When the anonymous narrator of O’Brien’s The Third Policeman speaks with the deadnot dead Mathers, Mathers only responds to him in the negative—“No,” “I will not,” “I am not,”
“I do not” (27-8). The narrator and his soul, Joe, finding that they have cracked the code, ask him
19

a question in which a negative response will result in an answer; the narrator says, “this answer
pleased me. It meant my mind had got to grips with his, that I was now almost arguing with him
and that we were behaving like two ordinary human beings. I did not understand all the terrible
things that had happened to me but I now began to think that I must be mistaken about them”
(O’Brien 28). Feeling that he has begun an “ordinary” conversation with an “ordinary” human,
the narrator no longer feels confused and terrified by the strange things that have happened to
him.
That the narrator finds solace in the fact that he can converse with Mathers as an
“ordinary human being” presents several narrative problems about the concept of the ordinary.
What does “ordinary” mean, particularly in the context of conversation and language? According
to Attridge, in his article “Nonsense, Ordinary Language Philosophy, and Flann O’Brien’s The
Third Policeman,” The Third Policeman draws on the same language principles concerning
nonsense language surrounding ordinary language philosophy and its counterpart as theorists
such as Wittgenstein and Austin (304). The tension between ordinary language and nonsense
language seems to be the driving force within O’Brien’s narrative, as the narrator searches for
“ordinary” human beings with which to converse, yet instead ends up with unnatural beings that
communicate in a nonsensical way. What is meant by nonsense here is that, as Attridge puts it,
“one feels not so much that sense data and language are misrepresenting reality as that something
has gone wrong with the mechanics of perception and assertion respectively, so that what is
being posited is not wrong but meaningless” (303).
The idea that words in this narrative world no longer convey meaning decenters an
ordinary logic system that would govern conversation. To borrow the words of Grice from his
Logic and Conversation, there is a general, cooperative principle (CP) understood by participants
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in a conversation (making up ordinary conversation), which one may distinguish by four
categories: quantity, quality, relation, and matter (Grice 45). If a conversation becomes nonsense,
one can assume that one of these categories has been breached, or as Grice calls it, a maxim has
been flouted, or exploited—that is, blatantly disregarded by a conversational participant leading
the conversation to be meaningless. Nonsense also refers to statements that are nonsensical due
to a referent that does not exist. Overall, the nonsense that both O’Brien’s narrator and the reader
experience can be categorized as that which employs standard discourse, looking and sounding
meaningful, but cannot be understood.
An example of such a breach in these principles of cooperative conversation occurs when
O’Brien’s unnamed narrator arrives at the police station and meets Sergeant Pluck, who asks,
“‘is it about a bicycle?’” and when the narrator replies, “no,” Pluck looks at him “incredulously”
(54-5). He is unable to believe that the narrator has not come to ask about a bicycle, and he
continues to ask him a series of bicycle-related questions to which the narrator always replies
“no.” Policeman MacCruiskeen, upon joining Pluck and the narrator at the station, also asks if
the narrator has come to inquire about a bicycle. When the narrator finally reveals that he is at
the station to report a stolen watch, MacCruiskeen replies, “‘That is an astonishing statement
[…] never in my puff did I hear of any man stealing anything but a bicycle when he was in his
sane senses’” (61). Ironically, both conversational participants believe the other has breached the
principles of conversation, both rely on a set of nonsensical implications—he says x, no one
before has ever said x without asking about bicycles which thus leads to an overall sense of
nonsense exchanged among the three of them. MacCruiskeen even suggests that what the
narrator refers to is also nonsensical because no man in his “sane senses” (which is perhaps a
linguistic redundancy on the part of MacCruiskeen) would steal anything but a bike.
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Attridge suggests that The Third Policeman underlines the importance of ordinary social
intercourse through its absence in the narrative—which imbues the narrator with a sense of
alienation (308). Referencing the narrator’s conversation with Mathers, where his “mind had got
to grips with his,” Attridge claims that this conversation “affords him a sense of “ordinariness
and humanity” (308); whereas, in the narrator’s conversations with the policemen Pluck and
MacCruiskeen, his inability to grasp the rules of their language “game,” “cuts him off from them
and quickens his sense of panicky Angst,” and thus alienates him (308).2 The narrator’s ability
throughout the narrative to find discursive and linguistic “ordinary-ness” among “ordinary”
humans quickly breaks down, further suggesting to Attridge that O’Brien’s world of nonsense
has been created by slowly subtracting the structure of ordinary language, through both the
novel’s plot and the speech of its characters, thus explaining why the narrator is unable to get any
“logical traction” within his new reality (311).
On the other hand, Attridge does not touch upon what it means for the general organizing
principle of a narrative to be nonsense when the “ordinary” suddenly becomes strange, and
nonsense language speaks into existence a material nonsense, as well. The policemen find the
narrator’s story to be unbelievable, not on the basis that he is lying, but because it is not about a
bicycle. Their astonishment at his statement seems to suggest that it is the narrator who is
unnatural and unfamiliar, and perhaps Attridge’s concept of alienation applies because the
narrator is alone, unable to conform to the “ordinary” standard of the policemen. I mean to
suggest that, within a novel such as The Third Policeman that is governed by a principle of
2

To finish the quotation, Attridge adds, “in accordance with Wittgenstein's axiom that a language game is
a form of life” (309). The use of “Angst,” italicized and capitalized, is because Attridge is drawing on the
German “angst,” translating to fear and using it more in an Heideggerean sense. I will follow up on the
notion of “language games” in Chapter 2.
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nonsense, the terms ordinary and nonsensical experience a reversal. That which is originally
deemed as ordinary suddenly becomes nonsensical when the referent of the ordinary narratively
disappears.
Thus, to interrogate not what the nonsense tries to mean but how it functions in relation
to the narrative is the first order of study. The narrator has pursued his entire life the study of the
philosopher called de Selby compiling a codex of his works. He is not just studying de Selby but
in fact living for him, as he says “it was for de Selby I committed my first serious sin. It was for
him that I committed my greatest sin” (O’Brien 9). We might note that this same sentiment of
cause—extreme devotion to a divine-like being is what triggers Thomas Bernhard’s narrator’s
lament in The Loser—his unworldly obligation to Glenn Gould. Ironically, O’Brien’s narrator
claims that for “most of de Selby’s theories, the ultimate outcome is inconclusive. It is a curious
enigma that so great a mind would question the most obvious realities and object even to things
scientifically demonstrated […] while believing absolutely in his own fantastic explanations of
the same phenomena” (52). We can draw from this statement that the narrator has spent most of
his life trying to make meaning out of nonsense, specifically de Selby’s nonsense, all the while
recognizing that it is an enigma. However, de Selby’s work focuses on questioning the most
obvious realities of life, which raises the question: why does the narrator not question the
realities of the nonsensical world into which he has been thrown?
If we ascribe to Attridge’s critical explanation, it is because the narrative realm of The
Third Policeman no longer affords the narrator logical traction to question reality because his
basis for formulating language and thoughts has been pulled out from under him and replaced
with nonsense principles instead. To take this explanation one step further, we must examine
several nonsensical aspects of the text and how they create a material nonsensicality, which then
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instead makes the “ordinary” nonsense. The narrator finds the police-barracks he had been
searching for and says that “the appearance of the house was the greatest surprise I had
encountered” (53).
As I approached, the house seemed to change its appearance. At first, it did nothing to
reconcile itself with the shape of an ordinary house but it became uncertain in outline like
a thing glimpsed under ruffled water. Then it became clear again and I saw that it began
to have some back to it, some spall space for rooms behind the frontage. I gathered this
from the fact that I seemed to see the front and the back of the ‘building’ simultaneously
from my position approaching what should have been the side. As there was no side that I
could see I thought the house must be triangular with its apex pointing towards me but
when I was only fifteen yards away I saw a small window apparently facing me and I
knew from that that there must be some side to it. […] It seemed ordinary enough at close
quarters except that it was very white and still. It was momentous and frightening; the
whole morning and the whole world seemed to have no purpose at all save to frame it and
give it some magnitude and position so that I could find it with my simple senses and
pretend to myself that I understood it (52).
This house, the police-barracks, is the first instance of material (physical) nonsense experienced
by the narrator. Rather than trying to understand the house, he waits for it to “reconcile itself”
with ordinary reality, thus giving strange agency to the house. Further, the narrator’s worldly
position upon seeing the house becomes questionable. If he sees the front and back of the house
“simultaneously,” this suggests that he is viewing the house from above despite the fact that he
has been walking toward it from the road. This, then, implies that the house is two-dimensional,
within a three-dimensional world. Again, the narrator’s grasp of what is “ordinary” about the
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house only turns up with something rather unnatural. The agency of the house returns at the end
of the narrator’s description literally altering the “purpose” of the world around him. Here,
Attridge’s sense of “nonsense” applies in that the narrator experiences something that looks
meaningful (the house) but remains to him is unintelligible—meaningless.
Creating agency for the nonsensical house to turn the world on its head enacts the
reversal of ordinary and nonsensical. The narrator only has his “simple senses” and must
“pretend” to understand the house, whereas the rest of reality, “the whole world,” conforms,
seems to understand the “meaning,” the sense of this house (“the whole world seemed to have no
other purpose at all”) except to give “magnitude” and “position” to the house. The house obeys
the nonsensical principles of the nonsensical world, leaving the narrator as the sole one who does
not understand the meaning of the house. And being that he is the only one not to understand,
then it follows that he must be the one who is nonsensical, unordinary. The very construction of
this reality undoes him, alienates him.
Thomas Bernhard’s narrator from The Loser similarly allows his reality to alienate him,
clinging to his own personal principles like O’Brien’s narrator. In the case of The Loser,
however, Bernhard’s narrator views “ordinary life” as nonsensical. The narrator refuses to be
ordinary on the basis that all life is meaningless unless it is marked by genius, something so
extraordinary that it can barely be called human. If it is not, then one might as well die—which
sounds something like what the tricky Michael Finnucane says to O’Brien’s narrator: “‘is it life?
[…] I would rather be without it, […] for there is a queer small utility in it. […] It is a great
mistake and a thing better done without, like bed-jars and foreign bacon. […] It is a queer
contraption, very dangerous, a certain death-trap” (O’Brien 45). The Loser has many other
narrative peculiarities created by its narrator which I will return to in Chapter 3, however I will
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focus here on his thoughts about life, death, and ordinariness as they function toward the
narrative.
The novel opens with the narrator considering life and death, the first line being, “suicide
calculated well in advance, I thought, no spontaneous act of desperation” (Bernhard 3). But this
first line only makes sense when we learn, anecdotally, that his friend Wertheimer has just
committed suicide. The narrator, knowing this, still begins his narrative by talking about Glenn
Gould, “the most important piano virtuoso of the century,” who “didn’t kill himself like
Wertheimer, but died, as they say, a natural death” (3). Glenn Gould’s position in the narrator’s
mind as “the most important piano virtuoso of the century” ensures that he will speak about him
first, rather than Wertheimer. He does not explain the nature of Wertheimer’s suicide for several
more pages. Instead, the narrator thinks about Gould and how he died of lung disease. Yet,
Glenn didn’t die from this lung disease, I thought. He was killed by the impasse he had
played himself into for almost forty years, I thought. He never gave up the piano, I
thought, of course not, whereas Wertheimer and I gave up the piano because we never
attained the inhuman state that Glenn attained, who by the way never escaped this
inhuman state, who didn’t even want to escape this inhuman state. Wertheimer had his
Bösendorfer grand piano auctioned off in the Dorotheum, I gave away my Steinway one
day to the nine-year-old daughter of a schoolteacher in Neukirchen near Altmünster so as
not to be tortured by it any longer. (6)
The narrator, fluctuating back and forth on his explanation as to why Gould died,
concerning his opinion about artistry, believes, and by extension believes of Wertheimer, that
there is no reason to continue to play piano unless he is the best, unless he attains the “inhuman
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state” of Gould—not just a mere virtuoso but an inhumanly excellent piano player. “Excellent”
falters in my description, simply because the narrator would never have used it in this context,
and explains another one of the reasons that this narrator falls flat. Instead, what he says: “I gave
up the piano because we never attained the inhuman state that Glenn attained, who by the way
never escaped this inhuman state, who didn’t even want to escape this inhuman state,” divides
Wertheimer and the narrator’s escape from being ordinary pianists from Gould choosing never to
escape. Bernhard’s narrator lives, perhaps, an inverse life to that of Garcia Madero. He is no
longer searching viciously for belonging and art, but is recovering in the aftermath of it. Still the
reason the narrator quits the piano echoes Garcia Madero’s feelings about the poetry course he
takes—nothing was happening. Rather than wait for something to happen, as Garcia Madero
does (perhaps because he is young), the narrator gives up both playing the piano and the physical
object, his prized Steinway, such that nothing will ever happen again (in terms of his art)
There is an almost parallel relationship between O’Brien’s narrator and Bernhard’s
narrator in terms of their guiding principles. O’Brien’s narrator gave up living an “ordinary” life
(running the farm his family left for him) in pursuit of creating a complete codex of de Selby’s
works. He was forced to commit murder in order to come up with the funds to continue his de
Selby research uninterrupted, and as a result, was killed by a bomb set up by Divney—losing the
opportunity to live any life at all. Bernhard’s narrator felt compelled to desert his study of music
because he already knew he would never be the best (this would be akin to if O’Brien’s narrator
knew there was already a complete codex of de Selby’s works). Thus, Bernhard’s narrator
deserted his music for philosophical studies because to continue while knowing he will never be
the best is equivalent to death—in fact, according to Bernhard’s narrator, death would be better.
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Both O’Brien’s narrator and Bernhard’s narrators are imbued with a sense of fear in
different ways. O’Brien’s narrator’s fear stems from the nonsensical world around him, he “felt
afraid” as he walked up to the hosue and finds its appearance to be extremely “frightening” (53).
On the other hand, Bernhard’s narrator’s fears melt into paranoia, as he reconsiders every
decision he has made in his life, how his decisions affected himself, Wertheimer, and Glenn
Gould, as well as fears that he is currently wasting his life away even though he has given up the
piano. Though not specifically stated by O’Brien’s narrator, fear emerging from alienation and
trapped in a reality that is unknowable only to the narrator characterizes the narrative’s sense of
paranoia. The idea that the narrator’s reality is shifting, perhaps even conspiring against him, to
communicate meaning that is understood by everyone except him, is certainly paranoia’s
description. Does this mean, then, that there is a natural link between nonsense and paranoia?
The Loser’s narrator who espouses, like any Poe character, paranoid symptoms across the
running monologue of the novel, lapses into near nonsensical palaver.
But for the moment, consider the paranoia present in Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49, if
only to recognize that paranoia and Pynchon go hand-in-hand. Lot 49’s Oedipa Maas experiences
persistent paranoia as she tries to uncover a conspiracy about a secret postal system called
Trystero. However, her inability to understand the landscape of Pynchon’s Southern California is
where most her paranoia most closely resembles the O’Brien narrator. Driving to find a motel in
San Narciso, she meditates on Southern California and the nature of radios, “there were to both
outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed meaning, of an intent to communicate”
(Pynchon 24). Again, this merely foreshadows the intense paranoia Oedipa will experience in her
search for “concealed meaning” in signs of a muted post horn, for a secret society embroiled in
an age-old conspiracy, to understand “words she couldn’t hear” (27), but as she looks out onto
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the city of San Narciso, “she and the Chevy seemed parked at the centre of an odd, religious
instant. As if, on some other frequency […] words were being spoken” (25).
Like O’Brien’s narrator, Oedipa believes that the world around her hides a “concealed
meaning”; it is “hieroglyphic,” and she has no way to understand it. It poses, consequently, the
same type of nonsense that characterizes The Third Policeman. As the world speaks and
communicates meaning to others, she believes, not that she is misrepresenting reality, but that
her perception, her understanding of reality, falters before this meaning. To her, the sounds of the
landscape are meaningless despite their “intent to communicate.” Again, the tension between
ordinary language and nonsense swells and thus reverses itself in this moment. The language
spoken by Oedipa’s surroundings is nonsensical and in paranoid-like building manner
communicates to everyone but her. She then, is the one who is nonsensical, unordinary, an
outsider looking in, and endures the same position as the unnamed narrator of The Third
Policeman, alienated from this world, its sounds are meaningless to her.
When MacCruiskeen shows O’Brien’s unnamed narrator hundreds of identical boxes that
decrease in size so much so that they become invisible, he is “reminded […] forcibly, strange
and foolish it may seem, of something I did not understand and had never even heard of”
(O’Brien 72). Like Oedipa, he accepts that the nonsense is not nonsense but meaning that he
cannot understand or grasp. Even further, as Pluck and Gilhaney take the narrator on an
expedition to find a stolen bicycle, and Pluck reveals that he stole and hid the parts of the bicycle
himself, the narrator replies, “I find it is a great strain for me to believe what I see, and I am
becoming afraid occasionally to look at some things in case they would have to be believed”
(82). The narrator willfully exposes a skepticism that he attempts to restrain when made to look
in on the nonsensical world that he fears, unable to believe the very nonsense even as it occurs
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before his eyes. His own ordinariness, naturalness, becomes meaningless, nonsensical, and he
too is alone in the narrative of this world.
Why, then, if Lot 49’s Oedipa experiences the same alienation and paranoia before
nonsense as The Third Policeman’s narrator is The Crying of Lot 49 never described as nonsense
language? One the one hand, the paranoia and alienation experienced by the The Third
Policeman’s narrator encompasses the reader. But Oedipa’s paranoia, on the other hand, derives
from a set of clues that undermine her already existing sense of reality (albeit a reality that
parodies that of the reader’s), and alienation or paranoia in The Third Policeman does not. At the
risk of grossly oversimplifying The Crying of Lot 49, its genre as mystery novel or detective
novel confirms that finding Trystero, and what it signifies, is Oedipa’s task, which she goes
about accomplishing by digging up more and more “clues,” endless clues, about the muted post
horn. O’Brien’s narrator neither has a set of clues to follow nor does he have a goal in mind other
than getting the box of money he was on his way to retrieve before he died. Even this goal, his
mission, is muddied by the nonsensical world around him. For example, the narrator decides he
will tell the police that he has had his American gold watch stolen to avoid revealing that he is
looking for money that he stole. As he walks to find the police-barracks he notes, “it was still
early morning, perhaps. If I had not lost my American gold watch it would be possible for me to
tell the time,” to which Joe responds, “you have no American gold watch” (O’Brien 52). In an
attempt to align himself with the principles of this nonsense world, the narrator changed his
“goal” through a cover story. However, he comes to believe his own lie and has to be reminded
by Joe that he is not really looking for his watch. Oedipa never attempts to align herself with the
principles of Trystero, nor does she have to. Instead, she desires, rather simply to translate the
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hieroglyphic meaning communicated by the symbol of the muted post horn, thereby unlocking
its secrets.
William Bywater in “The Paranoia of Postmodernism,” drawing on David Shapiro and
Stanley Fish to discuss paranoia and the idea of clues in postmodern novels, writes,
The suspiciousness of postmodernism certainly leads to a search for clues within the text
which eventually are used to undermine the authority of the text. These clues are
marshalled into an argument designed to show that the text cannot provide rules or norms
for its own interpretation. The postmodernist critic is then in a position to assert authority
over the text in, for example, a reader response approach to criticism in which, to quote
Fish, "the reader's response is not to the meaning; it is the meaning" (Bywater 80).
Likewise, in The Cambridge Introduction to Postmodern Fiction, Brian Nicol explores many
aspects of postmodernism and its subgenres, one of which is “postmodern detective fiction,”
which becomes synonymous with the “anti-detective” story. Acknowledged as a particularly
postmodern phenomenon, postmodern detective fiction frustrates the “modernist fantasy of
control and order” and instead “parodies or subverts traditional detective-story conventions—
such as narrative closer and the detective’s role as surrogate reader—with the intention, or at
least the effect, of asking questions about mysteries of being and knowing which transcend the
mere machinations of the mystery plot”3 (Nicol 172).
In effect, postmodern detective fiction frustrates both reader and critic. This is true of The
Crying of Lot 49, particularly in terms of frustration—and is perhaps the key difference between
3

Nicol quoting Patricia Merivale and Susan Elizabeth Sweeney from their text Detecting Texts.
Merivale, Patricia and Sweeney, Susan Elizabeth (1999) ‘The Game's Afoot: On the Trail of the Metaphysical
Detective Story’. In Merivale, and Sweeney, eds. Detecting Texts: The Metaphysical Detective Story from Poe to
Postmodernism. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1–24
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O’Brien and Pynchon’s novels, why one develops nonsense and the other paranoia. Of course,
the reader of The Crying of Lot 49 is frustrated when they come to the end of the novel only to
discover that the title, “the crying of lot 49,” is simply another loose end, the Marquise remained
pensive just like Oedipa continuing her search for Trystero. As Nicol suggests, the effect of this
postmodern detective fiction is to ask questions about mysteries of being and knowing, to
transcend the idea that a detective novel will solve its mystery by the end. However, the ordinary
reading remains frustrated—and wants to know, beyond the rules of genre, what Oedipa will find
at the auction. We want to know the truth behind Trystero, and we only decide to decipher these
transcendent meanings upon a re-examination of the various clues in the novel. The Third
Policeman obviously does not meet the conditions of a postmodern detective fiction; there is no
organizing generic principle by which we can define it, which is part of what makes it so difficult
to understand.
Even so, the un-understandable meaning of the language within the novel keeps
progressing. When MacCruiskeen pierces the narrator with a spear whose end is so sharp and
thin that it is nearly invisible, the narrator asks, “‘and what is this inch that is left?’” to which
MacCruiskeen replies, “‘that is the real point’” (O’Brien 68). MacCruiskeen further explains that
the point of the spear is “so thin that maybe it does not exist at all and you could spend half an
hour trying to think about it and you could put no thought around it in the end” (68-9). Thus, as
the narrator racks his brain, he still “made no progress at all as regards to the question of the
points” (69). Not unlike the reader’s experience with the novel, the narrative seems to become
self-conscious as it tells both reader and narrator that “the real point” is invisible, unknowable.
What exactly is the reader meant to extract from this nonsense world? Something about
bicycles? About death? If the narrative itself claims that the real point is invisible, how can we
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give the novel meaning? Even as the narrator makes no progress in giving meaning to the
“invisible point,” the policemen continue to push forth their nonsense, showing the narrator
hundreds of identical boxes, and claiming that people are at least half, if not more, bicycle. The
policemen speak in idiomatic expressions for which the reader cannot find a referent, such as
“that will make you think, unless I am an old Dutchman by profession and nationality” (67). The
reader, like the narrator, has no way to identify any part of the nonsense language as common
social discourse. The reader, unable to ascribe meaning to any of these interactions, perhaps
becomes alienated from the text—ordinary language has been stripped away so that nonsense
instead becomes “ordinary,” and, like the narrator, the reader has lost their footing.
Why, then, is O’Brien’s narrative so offending, to the point that it would be called
nonsense, meaningless? Is it exactly the nonsensical properties of the narrative that create this
effect? When faced with tensions between sense and nonsense in The Third Policeman, the fear
and alienation caused by the nonsense world impacts the reader. Because its world is
nonsensical, a logical reason to explain why the narrator would have a disembodied soul with his
own name cannot be found or even understood. Since no reason can be found within the text, the
burden of reasoning falls on the reader to wrestle with implications. By their own wits, then, they
create their own logic as to why a leprechaun-man finds life to be meaningless, and why a soul
would have more agency than the person to whom it belongs. What drives O’Brien’s The Third
Policeman is more concrete than a willful ambiguity, so far as meaninglessness can be called
concrete. It is the principles of nonsense, shifting the meaning of “ordinary” and consequently
making the narrator feel nonsensical that advances the narrative. The text poses questions about
souls, the meaning of life, and even asks what the “point” is—going so far as to suggest that it
invisible and unknowable—slowly, purposely alienating the reader, imbuing them with fear and
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distrust in the narrative. The meaning of this meaninglessness is, perhaps, to dispel the notion of
the “ordinary.” Holding on to it, as evidenced by the narrator, only further closes the narrative
off from understanding.
As the novel ends, the narrator finds himself walking back toward the police-barracks,
and looking upon them as if for the first time. Walking backward, in fact, is a thematic idea that
also touches The Savage Detectives as Lima and Belano reveal that one of the central principles
of visceral realism is to walk “‘backward, gazing at a point in the distance, but moving away
from it, walking straight toward the unknown’” (Bolaño 7). O’Brien’s narrator re-experiences the
shift of reality to give purpose to the house so that he could, once again, “find it with my simple
senses and pretend to myself that I understood it” (199). Again, he comes upon a policeman who
seems strange and unnatural, and in the last line of the novel, the policeman asks: “is it about a
bicycle” (199)? This repetition, the ironically cyclical nature of the narrative, demands a
rereading. That nonsense governs the diegesis, though it does not convey meaning by itself, can
be given meaning only by the reader, only if they question their acceptance of the ordinary. The
nonsense of The Third Policeman, this type of overall nonsense, is a very extreme example of
nonsensical narrative—the most disruptive example of all three novels I’ve chosen. I began with
O’Brien’s novel to 1) explain the framework of my understanding of ordinary and nonsense, and
2) to demonstrate what a complete reversal of ordinary and nonsense principles implies and 3)
how, sometimes, we crave the ordinary even when the narrative tells us to reject it.
How, then, do these readings of nonsense and ordinariness apply to the argument of this
thesis? These ideas, I claim, reappear in character analysis, through what I will refer to as
character-driven distortion. O’Brien’s narrator is imperative to the nonsensical nature of his
novel because, although we interpret the overarching narrative as nonsensical, the
34

meaninglessness of the narrative depends on the narrator’s inability to understand. Consider, for
example, when the narrator goes with Gilhaney and the Sergeant to find Gilhaney’s stolen
bicycle. The search lasts a very short time, as the Sergeant takes them directly to the location of
the bicycle and tells them where to look. The narrator says,
‘there is one puzzle […] that is hurting the back of my head and causing me a lot of
curiosity. It is about the bicycle. I have never heard of detective-work as good as that
being done before. Not only did you find the lost bicycle but you found all the clues as
well. […] What is the secret of your constabulary virtuosity?’ (O’Brien 82).
The Sergeant replies, “‘it was an easy thing. […] Even without the clues I could have succeeded
in ultimately finding the bicycle’” because it was the Sergeant who stole the bicycle in the first
place, and he already knew its location (82). Before the narrator asks about this success, the
reader, most likely, has the same question—how could the Sergeant have found the stolen
bicycle immediately upon looking for it? If the perspective of the Sergeant was the perspective
of the novel, or any of the other policemen, the novel would lapse in being nonsensical. There
would be nothing odd about the Sergeant finding the bicycle right away because we might
already know that he stole it, the way a Faulkner or a McEwan plot line might develop. We
would also not be faced with the reality-defying house that is the police-barracks because of the
change in agency: the Sergeant and the other policemen do not see it as reality-defying. Every
problem would always be about a bicycle, and the eternity chamber where hair never grows and
drinks never get drunk and time never passes would be a staple of ordinary life rather than a
nonsensical existence. The disarming incredulity of the narrator serves as our meter for the
ordinary, and he points out for us all the nonsensical aspects of the narrative world.
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In The Loser, the nonsense becomes apparent through the narrator’s principles, as well,
but in a different way. The narrator does not just give up playing because he is not good enough,
but because he is not as good as Glenn Gould, who reached an inhuman state by which he
escaped the dullness of life, the torturous state of being human—of living. For Wertheimer, the
narrator thinks, he believed “man is unhappiness […] to be born is to be unhappy, he said, and as
long as we live we reproduce this unhappiness” (63). For the narrator, however, man is not
simply unhappy. To live is to fail, even artistic achievement means nothing if the artist remains,
sadly, human like himself and Wertheimer. Glenn may have been unhappy, but certainly his
unhappiness was not that of other people. His unhappiness was that of man who had become the
object himself, who had become one with art, who had become inhuman—shedding the sense of
failure of other men (the fact that the novel has only men and not people or women is a telling,
organizational idea of Berhard). Glenn played himself to death, whereas the narrator ensured his
own destruction by giving his Steinway to a child.
Bitterly, the narrator reveals how he gave away the Steinway to the country piano
teacher,
The teacher accepted my gift immediately, I thought as I entered the inn. I hadn’t
believed in his daughter’s talent for a minute; the children of country schoolteachers are
always touted as having talent, above all musical talent, but in truth, they’re not talented
in anything, all these children are always completely without talent and even if one of
them can blow into a flute or pluck a zither or bang on a piano, that’s no proof of talent. I
knew I was giving up my expensive instrument to an absolutely worthless individual and
precisely for that reason I had it delivered to the teacher. The teacher’s daughter took my
instrument, one of the very best, one of the rarest and therefore most sought after and
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therefore also most expensive pianos in the world, and in the shortest period imaginable
destroyed it, rendered it worthless (7).
Of course, the failure of achievement haunts the narrator, steeps him in inescapable
misery, but much more than that, it causes him to envision a torturous outcome, the destruction
of his Steinway—the ignorance and willingness to allow a child to ruin achievement, greatness,
that he succumbs to by insuring that the future destruction will be carried out. Though it is
possible to imagine that the narrator’s expensive, rare, sought after Steinway being destroyed by
the child in the manner that children destroy all things—treating it with disrespect, letting it fall
into a state of disrepair, touching it with sticky hands, covering it with stickers, drawings,
smudges. But the narrator’s Steinway in fact was not destroyed in this manner; rather, it was
destroyed by a lack of talent, by the worthlessness and incompetency of being touched by anyone
less than a virtuoso. He picks on a child's incompetency in order to lament what is unacceptable
about being human, about being ordinary. The narrator uses a mode of discourse that not only
inverts any thoughts of innocence and the unknowing child, it strikes a means of bitter
complaint as the mode of expression. The child is not innocent but implicit in the torturous
destruction of art, like the town of Salzburg, “disgusting” and “antagonistic to everything of
value in a human being” (11). Ironically, the narrator thinks that the only thing of value in a
human being is how close that human is to escaping the condition of being human. This
bitterness, this distress at the state of life is a form of narrative distortion controlled by the
narrator and his views on life.
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Chapter 2: Meaninglessness and the Distorted Narrative

Many forms of narrative distortion, some being distortion of time, distortion of reality,
distortion of character, frequent postmodern and experimental novels of the twentieth century.
What do we intend when we introduce and isolate distortion as an analytical term that might
apply to these three novels? Consider first visual distortion, since it is an easier form to image
mentally, perhaps recalling expressionist and modernist painting of distorted faces. Let us be
specific and imagine Chaim Soutine’s “Le pâtissier de Cagnes,” a portrait of Remi Zochetto, a
pastry chef Soutine met in Céret (and one of Soutine’s only portraits where the subject’s name is
known). The image because of costume is easily recognizable as a chef—the subject wears a
white toque and coat and sits in what is most certainly a chair. However, the portrait gives the
impression of being looked at underwater—the water distorting Zochetto’s true image. His head,
incredibly shrunken, depicts ears half the size of his face, his shoulders both droop and protrude
in ways humanly impossible. The viewer knows now that this is a portrait of a real person, but
distorted such that we recognize a person but not a “real” person—not something that mimics
real life. We can also think of the better-known image of Edvard Munch’s The Scream, even less
recognizable as a real depiction and an actual landscape, but signifying nonetheless, or Francis
Bacon's agonizing, bloodied abstract faces in motion, or De Kooning's exaggerated, enlarged,
broad stroke portraits. All these examples work distortion to visually inform, and being visually
provoking, how far, we might ask, can this distortion extend before the distortion is no longer
signing distortion? Is it approaching an idea of nothingness, at least in regard to the depiction of
human form? Of course, the meaning of the art and the history behind it can always be distorted,
but the image itself we recognize as a distortion of “real life.”
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How can narrative, where the “image” remains only in the reader’s mind, undertake such
experiments in distortion? There is the simple answer that all literature is a distortion—even
realism. We too often take for granted that narratives are unrealistic because they assemble
prominent aspects of life that are not normative. That is to say, narratives exaggerate. We
unconsciously forget when reading, as is practice, that no matter how convincing, the protagonist
is not a real person. Of course, literature must distort even the most realistic of narratives.
Authors have no choice but to exaggerate simply because real life, for most of us, is boring,
perhaps un-recordable with the exception perhaps of Flaubert’s experiment in Bouvard and
Pécuchet. So why is it crucial in literature, then, to distort? Because literature is commercial, and
we must have interest in order to have readers? To sell books? John Barth writes in 1967 an
essay called “The Literature of Exhaustion,” by which he means the literature of “exhausted
possibility.” For Barth, many modes of representation and even possibilities for representation
have been “used up,” and have been, therefore, exhausted, particularly regarding realism. Does
this mean we have no choice now but to distort?
Narrative distortion plays a clever trick on its reader’s main desire to know. All literature
is about knowing; how much can we know about a certain novel and its author, what can the text
tell us, what can the history tell us, what can the social context tell us? Consider the detective
novel, whose main purpose is to uncover a mystery—or to have its character and reader uncover
a mystery simultaneously, like Poe’s “Murders in the Rue Morgue” the foundational detective
text. Or perhaps Balzac’s Sarrasine, wherein the partygoers desire to know where the de Lanty
fortune has come from, and Mme de Rochefide desires to hear the story of La Zambinella. This
is, of course, not a “detective text,” but it is a text about “knowing,” or what Barthes calls
“enigma.” After hearing the story of Sarrasine and La Zambinella, Mme de Rochefide turns on
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the narrator, banishing him from her sight once she hears the end of the story, but “the marquise
remained pensive.” She has heard the full story but remains pensive, still thinking, or as Barthes
writes in S/Z, “pensive, the Marquise can think of many of the things that have happened or that
will happen, but about which we shall never know anything: the infinite openness of the pensive
(and this is precisely its structural function) removes this final lexia from any classification”
(216). The detective text, then, represents a practice in how long a narrative can put off the
“knowing,” the tension it creates being its distortion—which Barthes of course writes about
extensively. However, this condition of “remaining pensive” is much more relevant to these
novels and to the concept of narrative distortion.
In the spirit of Bolaño’s childhood obsession, Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart,” suggests the
same sense of “unknowability” as the marquise remaining pensive. The unnamed narrator
begins, “True!—nervous—very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am; but why will you
say that I am mad?” (Poe 3). The narrative interpolates the reader into the narrator’s crimes, into
his own desire to know, “why will you say that I am mad,” he asks (emphasis my own). The
narrative here begins in medias res, a distortion of its own, accompanied by this monotonous yet
stilted, maniacal speech; he begs the listener, but here us, the readers, to “observe how
healthily—how calmly” he tells of the murder of the old man. He insists he is sane, that he
should not be called mad, for how could a mad person have enacted the crime with such calm
and precision. The reader must decide, then, how to interpret the narrative—whether or not they
will “observe” the narrator’s perspective of events or if they will find him mad. Even at the end
of the narrative, the reader will remain, like the marquise, pensive. This comes across as quite a
narrative anomaly, as the narrator insists to us, “now have I not told you that what you mistake
for madness is but over-acuteness of the senses?” (6). Yet we refuse to trust him because he is
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violating our understanding of ordinary narrative speech. Though he is also relaying the story of
a murder, that is not the subject of his madness—not the subject by which the narrator wishes to
be assessed, anyways. The narrator gives the reason for the murder, that the old man’s singular
pale-blue eye was a haunting, grating presence, which seems a rather weak reason for murder.
Yet the narrator knows this and he says, “now this is the point. You fancy me mad. Madmen
know nothing. But you should have seen me. You should have seen how wisely I proceeded—
with what caution— with what foresight—with what dissimulation I went to work!” (3). The
murder, for the narrator, is another thing entirely. What he insists is that the murder is not
madness because of the way he went about it, with caution, foresight, and dissimulation, coupled
with his “knowledge”—because “madmen know nothing.”
This is a challenging voice, challenging the reader to believe the narrator; but we resist.
Do we resist belief because we automatically assume the murder makes him a madman? Do we
resist because he keeps insisting that he is not mad? I believe it is the latter. His insistence, his
challenges to our thoughts/ what we imply from his narrative, again violates our understanding
of ordinary language. As David Lewis writes in Languages and Language, “it is a platitude—
something only a philosopher would dream of denying—that there are conventions of language,
although we do not find it easy to say what those conventions are” (Lewis 7). Although Gricean
conversation logic guides the first part of this thesis, and remains relevant throughout, I fear, for
ultimately not being a philosopher, the risk of oversimplifying the logic of language and
conversation, the generally accepted principles of speech to which we all conform. When one
does not conform, we notice. Consistent nonconformity to these principles forms a recognizable
pattern, which induces discomfort in us. This type of nonconformity, or the flouting of
conversational maxims, as Grice calls them, acts as distortion in “The Tell-Tale Heart.” The
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narrator’s aggressive insistence that he is not mad, that what he says is true, causes for the reader
perhaps even more discomfort than the fact that he tells us about a murder. The murder certainly
disturbs the reader, but the madness of the “murderer,” who is in this case the narrator, is no
longer implied. Because the narrator calls out to the reader, “why will you say that I am mad,”
we are almost certain that he is mad.
In an email interview with Carmen Boullosa in 2001, Bolaño writes, “as a teenager, I
went through a phase when I only read Poe” (Roberto Bolaño: The Last Interview). With a title
like The Savage Detectives, even without knowing of Bolaño’s teenage Poe obsession, the genre
of detective fiction would spark in any reader interested in uncovering the novel’s enigma.
Perhaps upon opening The Savage Detectives, a reader expects a Dupin-like character to uncover
the concealed meaning of the text, but instead they are faced with Juan Garcia Madero. In Peter
Baker’s text, “Is The Savage Detectives a Detective Story?” he claims that Garcia Madero
functions as the “naif, what Wallace Stevens called the “ephebe” or the “idiot questioner,”
representing a failed version of the modernist detective side-kick (Baker 29). However, I would
argue that Poe’s influence on the text is not found in the detective nature, but the narrative
peculiarities. Garcia Madero, as narrator, breaks similar conversational principles through his
narratives. We find Garcia Madero to be unreliable, just as we find Poe’s narrator unreliable,
because of his narrative peculiarities—the way he “speaks” to his reader (though not so directly
as Poe’s narrator). Although both narrator’s (Poe’s narrator and Garcia Madero) distort their
narratives in more ways than one, for now I will focus on their “speech” and will return to the
distortion of character, faces, and bodies, as I noted through the paintings, as well as the
distortion of time, which I have left untouched as of now.
Garcia Madero begins his journal entries with:
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NOVEMBER 2
I’ve been cordially invited to join the visceral realists. I accepted, of course. There was no
initiation ceremony. It was better that way.
NOVEMBER 3
I’m not really sure what visceral realism is (Bolaño 3).
His first journal entry, immediately contradicted by the second where he admits knowing nothing
of visceral realism, comes across like a joke. However, as his journals continue, it becomes clear
that if there is a joke, Garcia Madero is its butt. Explaining how he came to be part of the visceral
realist group, Garcia Madero describes the poetry workshop he visits weekly. Guest speakers
Belano and Lima immediately begin criticizing the professor, Julio César Àlamo, and Garcia
Madero, attempting to side with the guest speakers, accuses Àlamo of not knowing the definition
of specific literary terms, in this case a rispetto.4 Already knowing his professor is ignorant of the
definitions, and perhaps even unaware of the existence of these literary terms, Garcia Madero
deems him not much of a critic (4). However, when Belano and Lima admit they also do not
know what a rispetto is, Garcia Madero describes it as “noble,” “nobly, the visceral realists
admitted that they didn’t know either but my observation struck them as pertinent” (6).
Ironically, he prefaces this story by saying,
I don’t know what I was thinking. The only Mexican poet who knows things like that by
heart is Octavio Paz (our great enemy), the others are clueless, or at least that was what
4

If you find yourself like Professor Àlamo, “a rispetto, professor, is a kind of lyrical verse, romantic to be
precise, similar to the strambotto, with six or eight hendecasyllabic lines, the first four in the form of a
serventesio and the following composed in rhyming couplets” (Bolaño 5).
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Ulises Lima told me minutes after I joined the visceral realists and they embraced me as
one of their own” (4).5
Here, Garcia Madero has already aligned himself with the visceral realists, even before telling us
how he came to be part of their group. His use of the word “noble” stems from a sense of respect
or admiration for his newly found companions, the same feeling which causes him to “accept, of
course” their invitation.
When Garcia Madero leaves the poetry workshop with Belano and Lima, they go to a bar
to further discuss “poetry” and visceral realism late into the night. Even while reflecting on all
this, Garcia Madero still does not “really get it. In one sense, the name of the group is a joke. At
the same time, it’s completely in earnest” (7). Again, Garcia Madero seems one step behind the
rest of his new companions. Though at the moment he writes about them he has fully embraced
the name (visceral realist) and the people, the meaning of the movement still escapes him. This
confusion isn’t clarified by the visceral realists, however, since when asked by Garcia Madero
about visceral realism’s meaning, Ulises Lima only asserts a mysterious claim:
According to him [Lima], the present-day visceral realists walked backward. What do
you mean, backward? I asked.
‘Backward, gazing at a point in the distance, but moving away from it, walking
straight toward the unknown.’

5

I will discuss the irony of Garcia Madero behaving like Octavio Paz, the great enemy of visceral
realism, later in this chapter.
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I said I thought this sounded like the perfect way to walk. The truth was I had no
idea what he was talking about. If you stop and think about it, it’s no way to walk at all”
(7).
Garcia Madero explains to the reader the path he is about to take. He does not understand in the
slightest what it could mean to “walk backward” as the visceral realists do, but he desires it
nonetheless. Garcia Madero’s new “gang” seemingly subscribes to an absurd metaphor which, to
him, is inscrutable and unrealizable. His personal narrative constantly doubles over on itself, first
confident and self-assured, then undermining his own thought. However, Garcia Madero does
not do this as a means to weaken the visceral realist movement, or the guiding principles of his
new friends, as he says, “I’d obviously never heard of the group, but my ignorance in literary
matters is to blame for that (every book in the world is out there waiting to be read by me)” (7).
Instead this undermining self-consciousness reveals that the character, Garcia Madero, is
ashamed. He is deeply troubled by his own ignorance surrounding literary matters, despite his
insistence on criticizing his professor of ignorance regarding the definition of literary terms. He
undermines his writing, his personal narrative, through unintentional avoidance of concrete
statements, tying his character to fear and nervousness, as well.
These feelings of fear, shame, and insecurity make Garcia Madero a unique player in his
own tale, so unlike the bold, self-assured visceral realists with whom he spends his time. Perhaps
this doubling over on his words, his self-undermining, means that Garcia Madero is an unreliable
narrator. However, unreliability is not a proper analytic term here. For Garcia Madero to provide
unreliable narration, we must assume that the purpose of his character is to trick the reader, lead
them astray. What conclusion would he be leading the reader toward, then? That visceral realism
is good? That it is bad? These are such black and white conclusions, and to say Garcia Madero
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“leads” a reader to any conclusion imbues him with a huge amount of power that his character
seems not to possess.
Garcia Madero begins his journals on November 2nd, 1975, with his invitation to join the
visceral realists, which he “accepted, of course” (Bolaño 3). On the next day of his journal, he
writes his introduction, telling his reader who he is: “I’m seventeen years old, my name is Juan
García Madero, and I’m in my first semester of law school. I wanted to study literature, not law,
but my uncle insisted, and in the end I gave in” (3). Garcia Madero’s self-introduction suggests
the authorial intent of his journals. If the journals were for his own private reading, or for
cataloguing his days, why would he introduce himself in this way? Garcia Madero, then, with
this sense of public awareness, like Ishmael in Moby Dick, writes himself into his own “novel”
about the hunt for Belano, Lima, and visceral realism itself. But Garcia Madero’s introduction
explains only so much about himself as the details of interest lie not in his self-introduction but
in his self-sabotaging narration.
He describes how he met the visceral realists much like how he describes his acceptance
of their invitation—first with surety, perhaps even a sense of superiority since he “accepted, of
course” their invitation, and then with doubt, as he tells us he has no idea what visceral realism
is. Garcia Madero met Belano and Lima at a poetry workshop he signed up for at his university
as an act of devotion to literature, a way of staying true to his desires. He writes,
I had attended the workshop four times and nothing ever happened, though only in a
manner of speaking, of course, since naturally something always happened: we read
poems, and Álamo praised them or tore them to pieces, depending on his mood; one
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person would read, Álamo would critique, another person would read, Álamo would
critique, somebody else would read, Álamo would critique (3).
He describes this workshop as being led by a poetry-dictator who tears apart their work and
destroys any chance of friendship between members, as they are so often pitted against each
other. Álamo, their flighty professor, changing his opinion on poems based on his mood,
prevents “anything” from ever happening. In Garcia Madero’s opinion, Álamo is not much of a
critic, and just enjoys talking for the sake of talking because “he didn’t know what pentapody
was (a line of five feet in classical meter, as everybody knows), and he didn’t know what a
nicharchean was either (a line something like the phalaecean), or what a tetrastich was (a fourline stanza)” (4). However, Garcia Madero later reveals that his classmates make fun of him,
calling him “pedantic” and “an academicist,” for his “literary opinion,” and he himself even
comments on his “ignorance in literary matters” (7). What Garcia Madero perceives as “nothing”
happening in his poetry workshop may simply be “things” happening that he cannot or simply
does not understand. Even knowing this, Garcia Madero consistently derives a sense of
confidence in knowing, or having some state of knowledge, however false that confidence may
be. His fears and insecurities, then, are the fears of not understanding, or not belonging (due to
lack of knowledge).
Consider, again, the discussion between Mathers and the narrator of The Third
Policeman, wherein Mathers only responds in the negative. Joe, the narrator’s soul asks, “do you
notice anything?” to which the narrator replies, “no […] nothing beyond the eeriness of this
house and the man who owns it. He is by no means the best conversationalist I have ever met”
(O’Brien 27). The narrator cannot notice anything that falls beyond his ordinary domain of
understanding—particularly as it manifests in conversations. Joe prompts him further, “do you
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not see that every reply is in the negative? No matter what you ask him he says No” (27). When
the narrator still does not understand how to proceed in conversation, Joe insists, “use your
imagination” (27). Joe functions here as the “voice of reason,” yet as a reader we want to resist
this claim. How can Joe’s voice, the voice of a disembodied consciousness, signal some sense
of reason when the narrative dispels notions of ordinariness and sense? Even the narrator’s
imagination cannot help him understand this discursive moment, suggesting again something that
seems meaningful yet comes to the narrator in an unintelligible form.
The narrator’s “nothing” is similar to Garcia Madero’s “nothing,” then– an accidental
ignorance caused by the displacement of ordinary epistemic methods. For both narrators, nothing
is happening, but O’Brien’s narrator has the benefit of a Joe pushing him to notice the
nonsensical principles that drive this narrative world. Once O’Brien’s narrator accepts Joe’s
suggestion, the narrator begins to understand the “game” at play. In acknowledgement, he asks,
“‘will you answer a straight question?’” to which Mathers, of course, replies no, but then the
narrator asks, “‘will you refuse to answer a straight question?’” (28). Mathers still replies in the
negative, but in this case a negative reply yields a “positive” answer. Since Mathers “will not”
refuse to answer a straight question, it follows that he will begin to speak “normally.” This
pleases the narrator because “it meant my mind had got to grips with his, […] I did not
understand all the terrible things that had happened to me but I now began to think that I must be
mistaken about them” (28). Where previously the narrator could not look past the “eeriness of
this house and the man who owns it,” understanding the flow of conversation was all the
“knowledge” it took for the narrator to regain his confidence. His fears, which I argue derive
from the loss of ordinary language and thus result in nonsense, are appeased by this
pivotal moment of understanding. Mathers violates conversational maxims by opting out of “the
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operation of both the maxim and of the CP; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that
he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires,” which clarifies why the narrator
cannot grasp the reason for Mathers’ behavior (Grice 49). Once Mathers is forced to cooperate
with the Conversational Principle through trickery, the narrator has reentered his known, familiar
game. The Gricean maxims of conversation are those of “ordinary language,” the type of
conversation understood by the narrator, as I have previously described. But what this really
suggests is the notion of organizing principles, or what I have called ordinary methods of
understanding.
In the conversation between Mathers and O’Brien’s narrator, the narrator receives
external6 help from Joe in the rearranging of his thoughts such that he can understand the flow of
conversation. Garcia Madero, however, does not have this same help during his poetry class.
Until he met the visceral realists, Garcia Madero developed a system of understanding poetry
predicated on the very principles that opposed visceral realism. He evaluates the course, and the
professor, based on his idea of what is pertinent to the understanding of poetry—for Garcia
Madero, the form and formal elements are what matter (rispetto, pentapody, nicharchean,
phalaecean). He even reveals later, while playing the language guessing-game in the car with
Belano, Lima, and Lupe, that he memorized all the definitions (Bolaño 593). The categorical
memorization of these poetic jargons guide Garcia Madero’s understanding of poetry and bolster
his confidence; after all, how can Garcia Madero know less than these self-professed poets who
barely know what a phalacean is? Reinforced by this “knowledge,” Garcia Madero feels
confident to make claims about his poetry course, like nothing ever happens and his professor is
not much of a critic.
6

Being the narrator’s own soul, it seems imprecise to call Joe’s interjections “external,” however, we have no choice
but to separate the two since they are seemingly existing as separate entities within the same body.
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Garcia Madero’s accuses his professor of not knowing what a rispetto is twice: once at
the beginning of his course, and once during Belano and Lima’s visit to the class. The first time
he asks his professor what a rispetto is, the professor admonishes him: “Álamo thought that I was
demanding respect for my poems, and he went off on a tirade about objective criticism (for a
change), a minefield that every young poet must cross” (5).7 A rispetto is as Garcia Madero says,
an Italian form of lyrical verse, and in the context of formal poetic criticism he would be correct.
However, the word for “respect” in Spanish is “respeto,” which sounds quite like rispetto, and is
perhaps why Álamo misinterprets Garcia Madero’s question.8 “Rispetto” also translates to
“respect” from Italian. Garcia Madero is so enmeshed in his own naïve notion of what poetry
means that he refuses to think about the ordinary linguistic assumptions underlying their
conversation.
It may be true that Álamo does not know what a rispetto is, but in the context of his
poetry course, talking about a poetic form like a rispetto is unnecessary (we can assume this
based on Garcia Madero’s exhaustive list of terms unknown to his class and professor, as well as
the fact that Álamo says “don’t give me that crap” and his classmates call him pedantic). It is
Garcia Madero, then, who violates the norms of ordinary conversation by assuming his professor
will know he means “rispetto” the poetic form and not “respeto” (respect). Garcia Madero
denigrates Álamo for this mistake, cutting him off and then, putting “the question to him again,
this time enunciating as clearly as possible” (4). Garcia Madero assumes his manner of
understanding poetry to be correct—at least more genuine than the way Álamo conducts his
course and critiques his students. That Garcia Madero does not notice—or does not note in his
7

I will include the original Spanish here: “Álamo pensó que yo le exigía respeto para mis poesías y se largó a hablar
de la crítica objetiva (para variar), que es un campo de minas por donde debe transitar todo joven poeta” (Bolaño
14).
8
This may be irrelevant to say, as the fact that “rispetto” and “respeto” sound similar is much more evident in the
original Spanish (as evidenced in the previous footnote), but I find it important nonetheless.
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journals—the possibility of this linguistic blunder and focuses only on asking his question again
coincidentally mimics the behavior of O’Brien’s narrator. His insistence that his categorical
knowledge of these poetry terms is the correct way to interpret poetry means that the meaning of
the poetry course escapes him, or comes to him in unintelligible terms (“nothing ever
happened”).
Like O’Brien’s narrator, Garcia Madero does not notice anything strange about his
behavior in the poetry workshop until the visceral realists point it out to him after the fact (much
like Joe for the narrator of The Third Policeman). Ulises Lima tells him that “the only Mexican
poet who knows things like that by heart is Octavio Paz (our great enemy)” moments after
joining the visceral realists, which is chronologically after he has the argument with Álamo at the
poetry workshop where Belano and Lima are present (Bolaño 4). Because Garcia Madero reveals
this mistake before he tells the story of his argument with Álamo during the workshop, he feels
confident to write the story in his journal; despite the fact that he made a fatal mistake at the time
of the argument (in terms of the visceral realists, his new group), Garcia Madero already has
knowledge of the visceral realist principles when he writes the story. His lack of knowledge in
that moment does not reflect his “current” understanding. He has been corrected by Lima
(perhaps the Joe of the moment). However, Garcia Madero does not truly take these principles to
heart—the idea that Octavio Paz is their great enemy does not resonate with him, as he does not
really know what that means other than that he made a mistake by assuming that the
understanding of poetry is predicated on form. He even writes, quite confusingly, “poetry (real
poetry) is like that: you can sense it, you can feel it in the air, the way they say certain highly
attuned animals (snakes, worms, rats, and some birds) can detect an earthquake” (5).
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So, despite Garcia Madero’s earlier insistence to Álamo, and to his readers, that real
poetry is comprised of pentapody, nicharchean, phalaecean, and the knowing of those terms, he
now says that “real poetry” can be felt. And when Ulises Lima reads his poem to the workshop,
Garcia Madero writes, “I heard his voice, reading the best poem I had ever heard” (7). He does
not reveal whether the formal elements he had previously lauded could be found in Ulises’ poem,
nor does he find the poem to be lacking because Ulises had revealed to him that he did not know
the term rispetto. Instead, he feels that the poem is the best poem he’s ever heard, like a snake,
worm, rat, or bird might—demonstrating again with the list of animals a categorical type of
knowledge on which to predicate his claims. After the events of the poetry workshop, writes
Jonathan Beck Monroe in “Dismantling Narrative Drive” in Part Three of his text Framing
Roberto Bolaño,
Garcia Madero finds himself configured among three options: 1) the formalist leanings he
initially brought to the workshop, which succeeded in enraging the workshop’s professor
and prompted Garcia Madero’s peers to reject him as “pedantic” and “academicist” (“me
acusaron de pedante (uno dijo que yo era un academicista”); 2) the work of Octavio Paz,
the “only Mexican poet,” according to Lima, who shares the kind of formal, technical
knowledge Garcia Madero prizes, who is yet visceral realism’s “great enemy,” and 3)
Belano’s and Lima’s favored visceral realists, “a Mexican avant-garde group … active in
the twenties or maybe the thirties” represented by Tinajero (Monroe 111).
He chooses, of course, option three because his other two options resulted in isolation from
poetry, when studying literature is his greatest desire. He also finds belonging among these
visceral realists, who are themselves isolated from the Mexican poetic tradition of the time. Yet,
as I mentioned, the principles of visceral realism do not mean anything to Garcia Madero beyond
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his desire to ascribe to them so he can be a part of the group. Consider his reading of “The
Vampire” (“El Vampiro”) by the poet “Efrén Rebolledo (1877-1929)” which they “never said
anything about […] in any of our literature classes,” of which he copies the poem out entirely
into his journal (12). To borrow Monroe’s analysis of this moment,
The distance between the verse poems García Madero mentions and the prose-poetic
journal entries of his fragmented narrative is the distance between the naïve aspiring
apprentice and the mature, visceral realist, prose-poetic, still poetry-obsessed Bolaño.
[…] Unsurprisingly, for a seventeen-year-old poet about to embark on his first sexual
adventures, “El vampiro” exemplifies, in Bolaño’s deployment of it as exhibit, the appeal
of a more conventional poetics associated with love and traditional verse forms.
Recalling Poe’s constrained investments in such forms, García Madero’s literal
reproduction of Rebolledo’s appropriation and variation of Baudelaire’s identically titled,
six-quatrain poem, “Le Vampire,” echoing Poe’s “The Raven” and other gothic-erotic
poems, figures poetry itself as “Vampire” verse, as fetishized object, pure product, pure
genre, pure kitsch. In stark contrast to Poe’s radical dismantling of the poetry/prose
binary in “The Poetic Principle” and “The Philosophy of Composition” and experimental,
genre-defining, genre-expanding range as a writer of prose fiction, with all its protovisceral realist qualities, García Madero’s enthusiasm for “The Vampire” suggests his
identification with poetry as an adolescent genre, as the genre of adolescence as such.
Recalling the ostentatious, precocious-yet-naïve references to traditional verse
forms and ancient sources García Madero’s workshop peers found “pedantic,” García
Madero’s enthusiasm for Rebolledo’s gothic conventionality suggests the gap between
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the visceral realist ambitions of Bolaño’s doppelgänger and namesake, Belano, to
‘change Latin American poetry’ (Monroe 111-112).
What Monroe fails to mention, however, is that “The Vampire” is a poem by Octavio
Paz, translated by Samuel Beckett from Anthology of Mexican Poetry (1970)—an anthology
compiled by Paz himself. As Monroe says, the fetishizing of poem as object through Garcia
Madero’s reading of “The Vampire” (which launches him into a masturbatory episode) suggests
the gap between the “visceral realist ambitions” and Garcia Madero’s own “naïve”
(mis)understanding of poetry. Even the masturbation that occurs after reading the poem, but
before his written analysis of it, signals Garcia Madero’s adolescence—his youthful, exploratory,
and naïve nature. If all poetry is “‘Vampire’ verse’,” as Monroe suggests, then Garcia Madero
can never escape his preconceived ideas about the meaning of poetry. His organizing principles
of understanding, which he was lightly scolded for by Ulises, remain with him throughout the
novel—as he returns to his formalistic memorization for the language game with Ulises and
Belano in the Sonora Desert. This is not to say that they remain unaltered altogether (although
that may be what Monroe is suggesting), but that one’s own system of understanding is not so
easily forgotten—or the narrator of The Third Policeman would have had more success in his
nonsense world with the help of Joe.
O’Brien’s narrator’s organizing principles extend beyond just ordinary language and
ordinary conversational principles. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the narrator has lived his life by
and for a philosopher called de Selby whose works focus on questioning “the most obvious
realities” resulting in an inconclusive outcome (O’Brien 52). I also asked the question: if the
narrator has spent all his life studying the works of de Selby, why does the narrator not question
the realities of the nonsensical world he has been thrown in to? I will explore another symbiotic
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answer to this question here. Before the narrator meets Sergeant Pluck, Policeman
MacCruiskeen, and Mr. Gilhaney in the police barracks, he describes the walk he makes to find
them after talking to Mathers,
Of all the many striking statements made by de Selby, I do not think that any of them can
rival his assertion that ‘a journey is an hallucination’. […] His theory, insofar as I can
understand it, seems to discount the testimony of human experience and is at variance
with everything I have learnt myself on many a country walk. Human existence de Selby
has defined as ‘a succession of static experiences each infinitely brief’, a conception
which he is thought to have arrived at from examining some old cinematograph films
which belonged to his nephew. 9 From this premise he discounts the reality or truth of any
progression or serialism in life, denies that time can pass as such in the accepted sense
and attributes to hallucinations the commonly experienced sensation of progression as,
for instance, in journeying from one place to another or even ‘living’. […] Of my own
journey to the police-barracks I need only say that it was no hallucination (50, 52).
Despite the existence of Joe, the narrator’s voice of reason, he still clings to the works of de
Selby to describe his experiences, or compare his experiences against. Here the narrator
discusses the idea that a journey is a hallucination, but footnotes that de Selby said these things
because he did not properly understand the “cinematograph.” Even in his description of de
Selby’s ideas, the narrator notes that de Selby’s theory goes against his own experiences on

9

The narrator adds a footnote within his discussion of de Selby’s theories here: “these are evidently the same films
which he mentions in Golden Hours (p. 155) as having ‘a strong repetitive element’ and as being ‘tedious’.
Apparently he had examined them patiently picture by picture and imagined that they would be screened in the same
way, failing at that time to grasp the principle of the cinematograph” (O’Brien 50). The narrator diligently cites de
Selby’s works throughout the novel, as well as other “books” written about de Selby. I will discuss further the
difficulty in understanding whether the narrator’s narration is coming to us as a written type of journal (like Garcia
Madero’s), and this insistence that de Selby is “real” in Chapter 3.
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“many a country walk.” Nonetheless, the narrator uses de Selby to measure yet another country
walk to the police-barracks, which he claims is certainly not a hallucination of the de Selbian
variety. Ironically, on this walk to find the barracks the narrator meets Martin Finnucane, the
leprechaun-like man who speaks in riddles and has tricky eyes—a “droll customer,” as Joe calls
him—and comes across the reality-defying house that is the police station. If these events were a
hallucination they would be easier to understand, but de Selby’s “hallucination” stems from the
idea that “motion is an illusion,” and the narrator is certain that he is in motion (52). The
narrator’s deep understanding of de Selby’s nonsensical works allows him to continue his
journey because he can compare aspects of his experience with the aspects that de Selby has
covered in his works and be confident in his knowing that those theories are an enigma;
therefore, the world before him now does not scare him away entirely because it is not
nonsensical through the lens of his own organizing principles.
This distortion of organizing principles creates meaninglessness and nonsense within the
narrative, along with the abandonment of ordinary language and conversational principles. Yet,
this distortion is of the organizing principles of the narrators with which we align ourselves (or
attempt to) upon beginning a novel. The narrative itself, outside of the narrator’s perspective also
distorts a reader’s understanding of the text. Throughout this chapter I have intentionally read
Garcia Madero away from the critical explanations on which Monroe depends, that he is an
expositor of the poetry, that his poetic disposition links him to that of Lima and Belano’s and
underlies the novel’s entire effort to create the novel as poetic form. Instead, I have willfully read
Garcia Madero as an O’Brien-like narrator who is continually self-destructing under the rigid
nonsensical logic by which he reads the world. De Selby and Belano and Lima, their
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authoritative dominance, is not only being mocked, but wreaking havoc on the narrative
functioning of these two Poe-like I personas.
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Chapter 3: Distortion as Discursive Mode
Part 1“Mexicans Lost in Mexico (1975)” of Roberto Bolaño’s The Savage Detectives
begins in Mexico City where a 17-year-old Juan Garcia Madero narrates through daily journal
entries the events of his admittance into the visceral realist (realismo visceral) movement.
Invited to join by the two founders of the movement, Arturo Belano and Ulises Lima, Garcia
Madero drops out of University to write poetry full-time and engage with other members of the
movement. Despite being invited to join by Belano and Lima, the two founders remain absent
figures throughout most of Part I, fueling Garcia Madero’s obsession with Belano, Lima, and
visceral realism as a whole. Part III “The Sonora Desert (1976)” picks up Garcia Madero’s
narrative journal entries where Part I ended, with Garcia Madero, Belano, Lima, and the
prostitute Lupe escaping Mexico City—running from Lupe’s pimp and a corrupt Mexican police
officer named Alberto. Part II “The Savage Detectives (1976-1996),” however, disrupts the
chronology of Garcia Madero’s narration. Consisting of over 80 different character’s narratives,
which I and many other critics interpret as “interviews,” a cast of some minor characters, as well
as characters that played a larger role in Garcia Madero’s earlier journal entries, share stories
related to Belano and Lima—things that the two told them, how they met, various exploits they
shared. What remains particularly disruptive about these interviews is that, if they are interviews,
we as readers do not know what questions are being asked. For example, Joaquin Vásquez
Amaral, walking on a university campus in the American Midwest, in February of 1977 begins
his answer with, “no, no, no, of course not. That boy Belano was an extremely nice person”
(Bolaño 209).
The novel’s second part, “The Savage Detectives (1976-1996)” proceeds much like
Garcia Madero’s journal entries. They are dated, but they date the moment of interview, not the
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moment at which the story the interviewee is relaying happens. Further, interviews with the same
person are not always continuous. For instance, Amadeo Salvatierra’s interviews in 1976 are
interspersed across all twenty-six chapters, disrupted by other interviews taking place from 19771996. The rest of the interviews proceed by date, even when it is the same person being
interviewed, like Joaquín Font who is interviewed several times between 1976 and 1996. The
placement of Part II also successfully escapes text-time without explanation to the reader
because of the way both a novel’s and a reader’s concept of time function. Although Part II is
dated 1976-1996, and Part III happens chronologically prior to these interviews, the text places it
after Part II—the labels of I, II, and III, with their veneer of organization, contribute to this
misapprehension as well. The desire to read from I-III in the order they are written underlines
our implicit acceptance of time as linear and that is the deceit upon which the narrative plays to
meet the reader’s desire to follow a linear story. The fact that we read The Savage Detectives
from textual beginning to end because neither the narrative nor the author tells us otherwise at
any point suggests that there is something absurd about the unconscious way we read literature.
Allow me, then, to fixate on time and this novel. We know that the interviews that
compose Part II “The Savage Detectives (1976-1996)” disrupt Garcia Madero’s journalistic
narrative that make up parts I and III, despite taking place chronologically after Part III ends.
Time as it relates to narrative text, writes Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan following Gérard Genette,
constructs itself through order, duration, and frequency of events—order being chronology. Texttime “is bound to be one-directional and irreversible, because language prescribes a linear
figuration of signs and hence a linear presentation of information about things. […] There are
some modern attempts to liberate narrative fiction from these constraints, but the liberation is
never complete because a complete one, if possible, will destroy intelligibility” (Rimmon-Kenan
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45). Beckett’s Watt and Cortázar’s Hopscotch as examples she uses illustrate narrative attempts
to escape the linearity prescribed by language through the former’s reorganizing of words in
sentences or the latter’s variable order of chapters. However, she notes, these attempts must
always be explained first to the reader, either by the narrator of the text or the author himself (as
with Cortázar). “Text-time is thus inescapably linear,” she writes (45).
Bolaño’s The Savage Detectives tricks its reader by this very concept concerning the
reader’s intuitive understanding of time as linear and irreversible. Of course, as Rimmon-Kenan
also points out, readers also have an intuitive understanding of analepsis (flashback) and
prolepsis (flash-forward), since it is part of a reader’s every-day conversational life, and The
Savage Detectives takes advantage of that, as well. All three parts of the novel give the
impression of linearity, in fact they insist on chronology, through Garcia Madero’s dated journal
entries in Part I and Part III and the meticulously dated interviews in Part II. However, closer
inspection of the reader’s initial perception of the “order of events” within the novel prove to be
anything but linear. For example, Garcia Madero begins his journal entry on November 2nd, 1975
with “I’ve been cordially invited to join the visceral realists.” Yet on November 3rd, he writes of
all the events of his poetry course leading up to the moment that the visceral realists invited him
to join the movement. He writes, “this was the fifth session of Álamo’s workshop that I’d
attended (but it might just as well have been the eighth or the ninth, since lately I’ve been
noticing that time can expand or contract at will)” (Bolaño 5). Garcia Madero’s telling of the
story is always-already out of order in ways in which he, ironically, points out to the reader. He
begins his tale with his invitation to the group and then writes about his poetry group which he
says takes place before his invitation to join the visceral realists, since they did not join the
poetry group until the fifth (or eighth or even ninth) session.
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That Garcia Madero intentionally distorts the moment mimics the way that Realist
narratives distort and exaggerate their capability of reducing literary complexity to singular
answers. Garcia Madero, of course, does not describe every meeting of the poetry workshop
because “nothing ever happened,” nor does he describe how he gets out of bed in the morning,
how he leaves his house, how he gets to the workshop, how he enters the room in which the
workshop is held, how he interacts with his classmates, or any other mundane activity that
consists of “doing something.” Because that “something” is irrelevant, boring, or known to be
completed by inference, and narratives must omit the boring to make room for the narration that
compels attention. They must highlight, as Garcia Madero seems to have done, the “important”
or decisive moments of life, and Garcia Madero calls special attention to this claim, as he says
that nothing happens in the poetry workshop “though only in a manner of speaking, of course,
since naturally something always happened” (3). The Savage Detectives intentionally and
successfully distorts narrative time without prior explanation by playing on the reader’s
preconceived understanding of reality. Garcia Madero does not need to point out that even when
he says nothing happened, something always happened, even though he does, which mildly
associates him with the narrator of The Third Policeman. Even the most realistic of narratives,
those that dread a lack or a pause in the authenticity of presenting reality, do not point this out.
Why should they? As Garcia Madero says, time does expand and contract at will, the way time
ordinarily passes for us, marked simply by events which we hold as more important/significant
than others (other events being the boring ones, like opening doors, walking places, taking a
shower—unless you are Ulises Lima and happen to take a book with you into the shower).
In Amadeo Salvatierra’s interview on Calle República de Venezuela, near the Palacio de
la Inquisición, Mexico City DF, January 1976, the absurdity of literature returns, with the absurd
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idea that literature means anything deeper than what we think, that it drives us anywhere.
Amadeo finally finds what “the boys” were looking for, Cesárea’s poem; “they said gee,
Amadeo, is this the only thing of hers you have? is this her only published poem? and I said, or
maybe I whispered: why yes, boys, that’s all there is. And I added, as if to gauge what they really
felt: disappointing, isn’t it?” (397). Amadeo does not give the “boys” in his narrative names, but
we assume that they are Belano and Lima, or as Amadeo describes them “the Chilean” and “the
Mexican.” They have reached a turning point in their work as detectives searching for Cesárea;
though they have not yet found the person herself, they have found the first and only of her
published works. While Belano and Lima inspect the poem, Amadeo daydreams about his past
with friends and with Cesárea, seemingly unaware of the vigorous and hearty search the boys
have gone through to find Cesárea’s poem. The language of the above quotation, its colloquial
lower case speech, its continuous narrative entanglement, its adolescent projection deflates the
momentous moment. The fact that Amadeo does not immediately reveal the contents of the
poem reinforces his narrative perspective, and when he further asks the boys if they are
disappointed, the boys do not reply. But it remains unclear what Amadeo is asking about—
perhaps they are disappointed by the fact that there is only one poem, one published example of
her work.
However, later, after Amadeo reveals the poem to the reader and revisits it himself, we
discover that the poem itself is the disappointment in Amadeo’s eyes. Finally, one of the boys
disrupts Amadeo’s daydream by saying that he had seen Cesárea’s poem in a dream when he was
young. Amadeo replies,
Cesárea Tinajero’s poem? Had he seen it when he was seven years old? And did he
understand it? Did he know what it meant? Because it had to mean something, didn’t it?
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And the boys looked at me and said no, Amadeo, a poem doesn’t necessarily have to
mean anything, except that it’s a poem, although this one, Cesárea’s, might not even be
that (397).
Here the indecision as to whether the poem is a poem or not a poem—its high seriousness of
tone—recalls the indecision of the narrator in The Third Policeman. But later, the weight of the
moment is uncertain, quizzical, and nearly comic by making certainty come under so heavy a set
of picking out the ordinary in the world. Here in The Savage Detectives it potentially undermines
the holy grail-like search for that singular ur-poem, casting doubt that what is before them is
even poetry.
Just as Part II functions as a delay, delaying the continuation of Garcia Madero’s story,
Amadeo’s narrative delays the revelation of the climactic poem. Amadeo is interviewed at least
once, if not more times, across each chapter of Part II. The “boys,” as he so affectionately calls
them, have come to him to learn about his connection to Cesárea—they know he has
“something” to show them. After waiting through each of Amadeo’s continuous interview
snippets, the boys finally come across the poem, but the reader still does not. He gives them the
poem and he
stopped watching them and I stopped talking and I stretched, crack, crack, and one of
them lifted his gaze at the sound and looked at me as if to make sure I hadn’t fallen to
pieces, and then he went back to Cesárea, and I yawned or sighed and for a second,
distant images passed before my eyes of Cesárea and her friends walking down a street in
the north of Mexico City (397).
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Amadeo’s narrative relies heavily on “and,” or “and then,” lengthening the sentence, delaying
the outcome with the sound of his cracking joints, his yawn, his sigh, his daydreams. Even the
boys’ reply taunts the reader as he says it “might not even be [a poem].” Finally, after almost
begging the boys to tell him the meaning of the poem, it appears before us in the text—a sort of
pictogram consisting of different lines and shapes, titled “Síon.”
The revelation of the poem results in both an ending and a beginning. For Belano and
Lima, the poem furthers their desire to find Cesárea; for Amadeo, it is the end of poetry as he
knows it. We may say that three things occur here, not just one beginning and one ending. The
revelation of the poem does signal a beginning for Belano, Lima, and even Garcia Madero—they
are pushed forward on their journey to find Garcia Madero. On the other hand, Amadeo is
disappointed, and his knowledge of poetry and art is dead. This is an ending for the reader, as
well. We do not close the book upon discovering Cesárea’s poem—there are many pages left, so
of course we do not, for that would be improper reading etiquette. However, it seems we read on
because we must, not because we want to.
The revelation of Cesárea’s poem is a great disappointment to us, as well (it certainly was
for me) because it is so bland, so heavily understated. It also comes across as nonsensical. Why
should this depiction of different squiggly lines be considered the pinnacle of all visceral
realism? Why should we care about a poem that is really a joke, according to Belano and Lima?
The reader is like Amadeo, asking “what does it mean?” Amadeo says to Belano and Lima,
And I asked the boys, I said, boys, what do you make of this poem? I said, boys, I’ve
been looking at it for more than forty years and I’ve never understood a goddamn thing.
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Really. I might as well tell you the truth. And they said: it’s a joke, Amadeo, the poem is
a joke covering up something more serious. But what does it mean? I said (398).
Amadeo has spent the better part of his life trying to figure out the meaning of the poem, only to
have a couple of strange, dirty young men tell him the poem is a joke. They also told him
beforehand that a poem does not necessarily have a meaning, “except that it’s a poem.” Yet he
keeps asking them. He asks the boys when they arrive what the poem means, he asks them as
they look at the poem, and he asks them again after they have had some time to think about it, “I
said, what’s the mystery” (399)? The boys reply, “there is no mystery, Amadeo,” and this
statement ends the chapter. The reader must wait another twenty-five pages for the boys to
explain to Amadeo the “joke” of the poem, the lack of mystery behind it. The holy grail here,
Cesárea’s ur-poem, is purposely pulled out from under the reader’s feet—an example of the
continuous and invested debunking that creates the ever-delaying narrative. Perhaps cynicism,
rather than investment in feeling holds together Amadeo’s role in The Savage Detectives.10
Gabriele Guercio and Christopher S. Wood, in the text “What did the Savage Detectives
Find?”, write,
To judge from the effect it has on the detectives, there is quite a bit more to Cesárea’s
poem than this. The poem “Sión” rejects an academic-elitistic view of poetry and
creativity, renouncing any hope of legitimation from the outside based on interaction with
a codifed network of conventions that supposedly sustain poetical traditions in human
history. It is as if this poem offered a banal, ludic clue to what a poetry that tried to reach
back behind language would be like. Such a poem would guide us back into the shared,
10

I discuss later in this chapter more about Amadeo’s cynicism, and how this same idea holds together Bernhard’s
The Loser—through a deep investment in cynicism rather than art.
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pre-predicative Lebenswelt, a realm of uncoded signs where we proceed not by
interpretation but by recognition. In an interview of 1999, Bolaño said that “literature is
not made of words alone;” in other words, it can be translated without a disqualifying loss
of meaning (Guercio, Wood 273).
If this were the end of their reading, I would agree. Cesárea’s poem mimics the pictographic
games Garcia Madero plays with Belano, Lima, and Lupe on their car ride through the Sonora
Desert (Bolaño 609-613). They begin the game by Garcia Madero quizzing Belano, Lima, and
Lupe on literary terms, most of which they cannot seem to answer. Getting tired of this, Belano,
Lima, and Lupe quiz the passengers on slang terms—relating to marijuana and prostitutes,
among other things. Finally, Garcia Madero draws pictograms consisting mainly of circles,
asking his passengers to guess the meaning—to which the answers are things like, “a Mexican
smoking a pipe,” “five Mexicans peeing in a urinal,” and “a Mexican on a tricycle” (610). The
first two games they played were language games, and during these games the differences among
the passengers became clear. Garcia Madero could not answer any of the slang-related questions
posed by Belano, Lima, and Lupe, while the others could not decipher Garcia Madero’s literary
terms. In both language games played by Garcia Madero and Belano and Lima, the definition of
the term, once revealed, still means nothing to the guesser. The pictograph game suggests to all
that there is not necessarily a right or wrong answer, but that the answer—the meaning of the
pictograph—is open to their desires, to whatever they want it to be. None of the guessers can say
with certainty that the circles Garcia Madero drew “mean” five Mexicans peeing in a urinal, but
the picture, once “translated” into the idea of five Mexicans peeing in a urinal, does not need to
go any farther.

66

However, Guercio and Wood do not end their interpretation there, but argue instead that
there is more to Cesárea’s poem than whatever Belano and Lima have come up with—the unmysterious joke of the poem. They insist that Cesárea’s “very name is a crucial clue. For the
surname Tinajero, again, means ‘the one who makes large earthenware jugs’” (Guercio, Wood
273). Their analysis, then, becomes inextricably linked to pottery, and the meaning of Cesárea’s
name. The reason as to why Bolaño the author makes Cesárea’s only surviving work a pictogram
is because, “pottery moves almost directly from formless earth to formed pot. Thus does Bolaño,
through his character’s name, suggest the possibility of operating creatively by uncovering
discrete gaps between materials and forms, form and content, continuity in nature and changes in
culture” (274). Perhaps these sentiments about pottery hold true for the pictogram—it only gains
“form” or “meaning” through its shaping by others. In fact, this does seem to be true of Garcia
Madero’s pictograph game.
But what I find unconvincing is their presumption that Cesárea’s name gives the reader a
“crucial clue” as to the meaning of the “poem.” The visceral realists, the fictional beings
stepping outside their fiction, would laugh if someone suggested to them that the meaning of
Cesárea’s poem had anything to do with the “meaning” of her name, or for that matter, pottery.
Monroe, in his book Framing Roberto Bolaño, interprets Cesárea’s name in a different way,
through Spanish words that echo “Tinajero”: “‘tejer’ and ‘tejido,’ ‘tejedor’ and ‘tejo,’ Tinajero’s
last name suggests the shaping and fracturing, weaving and unweaving, raveling and unraveling
of plots” (Monroe 108). As Monroe says, these words all translate to terms surrounding weaving,
in that Cesárea’s presence/absence is at once weaving together and unraveling the so-called plot
of the novel. Monroe makes no mention of pottery or “large earthenware jugs.”
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Despite both authors focusing on the “deeper meaning” of Cesárea’s name as crucial to
the novel, they do not agree about what her name means. But is this not the joke Belano and
Lima are talking about? The idea that Cesárea’s pictographic poem—her last surviving work (or
her only work)—means anything deeper than what it looks like is the punchline. A poem, as
Belano and Lima have pointed out, does not have to mean anything, “except that it is a poem.”
Why, then, do critics of Bolaño’s work insist on parsing its meaning? It is tempting to agree with
these authors, to believe that dissecting the text, the words, the root of Cesárea’s name, will tell
us what the novel means. Nonetheless, the Cesárea within the world of the text is not a weaver,
nor is she a potter. Monroe’s interpretation that her present-absence engages in an unfolding and
unraveling of the narrative “drive,” as he calls it, is more convincing than Guercio and Wood’s
argument but still relies on “the text and nothing but the text”—and by text I mean the analysis
of the “literal” Roland Barthes point us to in S/Z, the words on the page, the tyranny of literal as
a system of interpretation.11 Is this not the absurdity of literature, the nonsensical space of
skepticism, that Belano and Lima, and by proxy the novel, mean to point out? That even after
being told a poem does not have to mean anything, Amadeo still insists that the boys tell him
what the meaning is?
After the twenty-five-page delay, Amadeo continues his quest for the meaning of
Cesárea’s poem,
What do you mean there’s no mystery to it? I said. There’s no mystery to it, Amadeo,
they said. And then they asked: what does the poem mean to you? Nothing, I said, it

11

“‘The text and nothing but the text’: this proposition has little meaning except intimidation: the literality of the text
is a system like any other: the literal in Balzac is, after all, nothing but the ‘transcription’ of another literality, that of
the symbol: euphemism is a language. In fact, the meaning of a text can be nothing but the plurality of its systems,
its infinite (circular) ‘transcribability’” (Barthes 120).
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doesn’t mean a thing. So why do you say it’s a poem? Well, because Cesárea said so, I
remembered. That’s the only reason why, because I had Cesárea’s word for it (Bolaño
421).
Amadeo insists constantly that the poem is a mystery, even though the boys tell him over and
over that there is no mystery, there are only the lines on the page and the “joke” behind it. If it is
a joke, why do Belano and Lima not reveal the humor right away? Well, because the humor of
Cesárea’s last poem is there before us, the readers taking the role of Belano and Lima in this
situation. From the perspective of Amadeo, the poem must have meaning, yet when the boys ask
him why he considers the lines on the page a poem, Amadeo’s only answer is because Cesárea
told him it was a poem. The boys then tell Amadeo about Piero Manzoni, an artist who “canned
his own shit,” to which Amadeo replies, “well, what do you know. Art has gone crazy boys, I
said, and they said: it’s always been crazy” (421). The comparison between Cesárea’s only poem
and Manzoni’s canned shit is the joke the boys mean to point out. Art is only art if you believe it
to be so, and it means whatever the viewer wills it to mean—nothing more, nothing less (a very
postmodern view, that takes great liberties with the belief in the high seriousness of art).
Amadeo’s reaction to Manzoni, that art has gone crazy, reveals the absurdity of art,
poetry, literature, and everything that demands definitiveness, containment. Amadeo is like
Garcia Madero, insisting that there must be a deeper level to every poem, and if there is not then
it is not a poem worth looking at. The boys play another “game” with Amadeo, beginning with
the title, “Síon,” and asking him what it means, “Zion, Mount Zion in Jerusalem, I said promptly,
also the Swiss city of Sion, Sitten in German, in the canton of Valais” (422). Amadeo’s thought
process mimics the analysis of our previous critics, Guercio, Wood, and Monroe, as he cannot
see that the poem is like the canned shit—a joke, signaling the absurdity of art that takes itself
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too seriously, willfully inflates its power. The boys go on to break the poem down for him, line
by line12, so to speak, ending with their same assertion that the poem is a joke. They suggest to
him that “Síon” is short for navigation (“navegación”), and the poem depicts a boat upon the sea.
Of course, the poem may not mean anything of the sort that Belano and Lima suggest, and the
title may not be short for navigation; but, because the boys tell Amadeo the poem depicts a boat
upon the sea, then it does.
Amadeo’s disappointment, and his inability to grasp what the poem means, exposes the
absurdity of a sense of erudition regarding literary works—an erudition which ties together all
three novels. Literature ironically privileges certain kinds of discourse, employed by all the
narrators of each text, to their great detriment. We can return to O’Brien’s narrator’s obsession
with the philosopher de Selby, for whom he “committed [his] greatest sin” (O’Brien 9). At the
age of sixteen, on March seventh, the narrator has his first experience with the works of de
Selby—a date, he confesses, that he remembers with more clarity than his own birthday (9). The
narrator, aware of the enigmatic nature of de Selby’s works, continues to spend the rest of his life
in pursuit of an all-encompassing knowledge of de Selby. Even after his death (although he does
not yet know that he is dead) he continues to cling to de Selby’s theories (“not unnaturally my
thoughts were never very far from de Selby” (O’Brien 92)). In Chapter 1, I detailed several of de
Selby’s theories, including that all journeys are hallucinations, but de Selby also posited that the
earth is not a sphere but “is ‘sausage-shaped’” (92) and that “darkness was simply an accretion of
‘black air’” and that “sleep was simply a succession of fainting-fits brought on by semiasphyxiation” due to this black air (116). A wealth of lengthy footnotes supplements each
mention of de Selby’s theories within the narrative, wherein the narrator cites other scholars of
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Another humorous element, given that the poem is made entirely of lines and no words.
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de Selby’s works (Hatchjaw and Basset being the most popular), as well as the discussions and
arguments surrounding de Selby’s many absurd theories, citing each of those texts, as well. In
effect, the narrator’s discussions of de Selby resemble any academic paper one might read today
about a real philosopher, and goes to great lengths insisting on the real-ness of de Selby,
constructing and deconstructing many of his ideas. Yet de Selby’s ideas are of no help to the
narrator in the world of the policemen. In fact, it may have benefitted O’Brien’s narrator to spend
less time thinking about de Selby and more time considering the strange and nonsensical world
before him. But this would perhaps improve practical matters for the narrator and ruin fiction for
the reader.
The narrator’s mimicry of academic and scholarly research signals the very discourse that
literature privileges. It suggests a type of intelligence that can only derive from a deep
involvement in academia, not common-sense intelligence. Clinging to this type of discourse, and
the necessity of complete and categorical knowledge of a subject, isolates the narrator (and the
reader, since we can neither understand de Selby nor the world of the policemen). For example,
when MacCruiskeen and the Sergeant take the narrator to “eternity” (which, hilariously, turns
out to be right down the road from the police-barracks), the narrator finds it impossible to
understand:
‘Is this eternity?’ I asked. ‘Why do you call it eternity?’
‘Feel my chin,’ MacCruiskeen said, smiling enigmatically.
‘We call it that,’ the Sergeant explained, ‘because you don’t grow old here. When you
leave here you will be the same age as you were coming in and the same stature and latitude.
There is an eight-day clock here with patent balanced action but it never goes.’
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‘How can you be sure you don’t grow old here?’
‘Feel my chin,’ MacCruiskeen said again (O’Brien 133).
Here the narrator’s conversation with MacCruiskeen and the Sergeant mimics the conversation
between Amadeo and Belano and Lima, with MacCruiskeen’s insistence for the narrator to “feel
his chin” being the same as Belano and Lima insisting that Cesárea’s poem is a joke. For the
policemen, the fact that hair does not grow in this place is enough to make it “eternity.” The
narrator resists this explanation, asking “how can you be sure?” The reader gets the impression
that the narrator desires a more well-researched answer, one with discussions both for and
against the idea that this place could be eternity. But all the narrator must do is accept the
information that is before him to “be sure” that eternity exists; he must accept the obvious
explanation by feeling MacCruiskeen’s chin.
The privileging of an academically-motivated type of knowledge is strikingly similar in
the narrative of Bolaño and O’Brien with Bernhard’s The Loser which draws out its erudition in
another direction—though it holds to the same values. Bernhard’s narrator has already revealed
to us his opinions on artistry; if one is not an inhuman genius, a virtuoso to the highest degree,
then they are not an artist whatsoever. He describes that his last teacher before Horowitz13 (the
teacher who had bonded Wertheimer, Glenn, and the narrator) had been
one of those teachers who suffocate a pupil with their own mediocrity, not to mention the
teachers who finished their degrees earlier and who all have brilliant careers, as they say,
performing at every moment in world cities and occupying highly paid chairs at our
famous music conservatories, but they’re nothing but piano-playing executioners without
13

It is worth mentioning that, like Glenn Gould, there is also a real-world Vladimir Horowitz.
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the faintest understanding of the concept of music, I thought. These music teachers are
playing and sitting everywhere and ruining thousands and hundreds of thousands of
music students, as if it were their life’s mission to suffocate the exceptional talent of our
musical youth before it’s developed (13).
For Bernhard’s narrator, the mediocrity of the masses is contagious. It seeps through the walls of
Salzburg apartments and stretches its cretinous aura toward unsuspecting musicians, it spreads
from teacher to student and suffocates her. Mediocrity is more than a mishap, it is a disease—the
killer of true art. The truest of art, per the narrator, consists of complete, if not exhaustive,
knowledge in an area of study—an idea which seems to resonate with the formalistic
memorizations of Garcia Madero. The narrator describes how he and Wertheimer came to end
their piano careers, Wertheimer
thought himself capable of becoming a piano virtuoso. By the way he played better than
the majority of our piano virtuosos with public careers, but in the end he wasn’t satisfied
with being (in the best of cases!) another piano virtuoso like all the others in Europe, and
he gave it all up […]. I myself played, I believe, better than Wertheimer, but I would
never have been able to play better than Glenn and for that reason (hence for the same
reasons as Wertheimer!) I gave up the piano from one moment to the next. I would have
had to play better than Glenn, and that wasn’t possible, was out of the question, and
therefore I gave up playing the piano. […] When we meet the very best, we have to give
up, I thought (8-9).
Like Garcia Madero (and Amadeo Salvatierra), the narrator believes that art has a true goal, a
true meaning, encased in formal perfection and virtuosic technicality, achieved by inhuman
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dedication (consider Glenn Gould’s endless hours playing The Goldberg Variations). However,
Bernhard’s narrator takes this idea one step further, for art is also a competition. When he
realized that he would never play as well as Glenn, the narrator had, in his opinion, no other
choice but to give up. It was “a necessary part of my deterioration process, I thought while
entering the inn. We try out all possible avenues and then abandon them, abruptly throw decades
of work in the garbage can” (14). Anything less than perfection deteriorates the world of true art,
therefore one must give up their music upon meeting the very best in the field. Ironically, this
sense of intellectual superiority becomes isolating for these narrators—even O’Brien’s narrator.
Bernhard’s narrator reflects on his and Wertheimer’s careers retrospectively, from the
position that he already knows the true meaning of art, and that meaning is Glenn Gould. His
cynical sentiments toward developing art, then, echo the words of Amadeo—“art has gone
crazy.” To Bernhard’s narrator, all music that is not at the level of Glenn Gould is like
Manzoni’s canned shit. Even his own musical abilities began to deteriorate upon meeting Glenn
Gould (“the very best”), such that he had to give away his very rare piano to an ungifted child.
As a result, the narrator isolates himself from experiencing, understanding, and even taking joy
from any other forms of art. Art is not joyous or exploratory, but rigid, precise, and inaccessible
to but a select few people. Privileging a specific type of intellectual discourse in literature, and in
poetry isolates Amadeo in the same way, like when the boys finally reveal to Amadeo that
Cesárea’s poem is a joke, “that’s all Amadeo, it’s as simple as that, nothing else to it, said the
boys and I would have liked to say that they had taken a weight off my mind, that’s what I would
have liked to say” (Bolaño 424). Learning that Cesárea’s poem is a joke and hearing the boys’
interpretation of it could never take a weight off Amadeo’s mind; he spent many years of his life
puzzling over the meaning of Cesarea’s poem, convinced it must have a meaning beyond being
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just a collection of lines. The entrance of Belano and Lima, with their new views on art and
visceral realism, brings to Amadeo a new type of art—one that rejects solid meaning, that to
Amadeo, disgraces the name of more intellectual, profound art. The old values of art he clings to
isolate him from both Cesárea’s poem and the changing world of Mexican literature. After
spending “more than forty years” trying to figure out the meaning of the poem, Amadeo may
have come to the same conclusion as Bernhard’s narrator—it is better to just give up.
The erudite nature of these novels, however, ventures into absurdity. Bernhard’s
unnamed narrator begins as he enters an inn by “thinking” about his friend, Glenn Gould, and his
friend Wertheimer, both of whom are dead at the age of fifty-one. We can say for certain that the
narrator is “thinking” about these two because the narration says, “I thought to myself as I
entered the inn” (3). This peculiarity in the narrator’s narration continues throughout the entire
novel, as he ends almost every sentence with “I thought” or “I thought to myself.” Writing about
this novel, now, becomes particularly difficult in that the narrator is not actually doing much at
all, nor is he often speaking with others. He is not writing, as we are certain Garcia Madero is
because he introduces himself to his readers through the format of his journal. But he is
repeatedly imaging and reimaging the inn or the layout of Wertheimer’s house or the servants’
distaste for those who misuse, misappreciate the splendor of the house’s wealth. On the very first
page, the narrator is entering an inn, and forty pages later, à la Tristram Shandy, the narrator is
still entering the inn. Those forty pages consist of the narrator telling the almost complete story
of his friendship with both Wertheimer and Glenn Gould—how they met, where they studied,
what they did together, various trips they took. Unlike the self-conscious doubling over of Garcia
Madero’s narrative, the narrator’s aim seems to be extreme precision of speech.
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The punctuated repetition of “I thought,” perhaps a clumsy version of Latin’s “incipit”
(he said) drives the novel closer to mania than to the ordinary. Additionally, the high degree of
specifying location (“to the nine-year-old daughter of a schoolteacher in Neukirchen near
Altmünster “) discloses another maniacal tic. He grasps onto details that are irrefutably true, such
as the location where he had the piano delivered, the age of the schoolteacher’s daughter, and the
fact that he has not yet entered the inn. The insistent presence of these incipits is essential to
Bernhard’s narrator, he is determined not to misrepresent any parts of the narrative, not to lead
the reader astray. His thoughts are simply his thoughts. For example, as the narrator describes his
“necessary deterioration” that began with the giving away of his piano, he says to himself, “I am
absolutely not a piano virtuoso, I said to myself, I am not an interpreter, I am not a reproducing
artist. No artist at all” (8). The narrator’s deification of Glenn Gould clarifies the narrator’s view
on the meaning of true art. However, we must also consider what kind of artist Glenn Gould was
(or, more specifically, what kind of art the narrator praised him for). The real-life Glenn Gould
had several of his own compositions, but the narrative does not care about the real-life Glenn
Gould. What the narrator praises him for is his interpretive work—his dedication to Bach, his
perfect playing of The Goldberg Variations. For the narrator, Glenn is the perfect interpreter, the
perfect reproductive artist, and he is not—as he says earlier. The idea that the narrator praises
perfect interpretation and reproduction of music adds another layer to the narrator’s maniacal
narrative tic of “I thought.” His precision of speech is like musical interpretation. Since he failed
to be a true reproductive artist, the narrator makes sure to reproduce his stories for us with as
much precision as possible, reminding us that his thoughts are subjective, and that when he says
them he is engaged in the act of thinking.14 Bernhard’s narrator seems to be echoing Poe’s
14

We should consider, as well, what Dorrit Cohn writes in Transparent Minds about post-monologic
insertions like “I spoke this” (which are like this narrator’s “I thought”): “The reason for these precautions
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narrator of “The Tell-Tale Heart” when he says, “hearken! and observe how healthily—how
calmly I can tell you the whole story” (Poe 3).
Garcia Madero’s narrative peculiarities read more like self-conscious honesty, where he
reveals to his reader that he lied to Maria Font about knowing the magazine Lee Harvey Oswald,
or that he lies about being a virgin, or that he takes poetic license when describing certain events.
Bernhard’s narrator inserts these incipits to create narrative precision, in perhaps a desperate
attempt to achieve perfection. Even in his own attempts with literature he says, “I didn’t read a
great deal and when I did it was always the same thing, the same books by the same authors, the
same philosophers over and over as if they were always completely new. I had developed the art
of perceiving the same thing over and over as something new, developed it to a high, absurdly
high skill” (41). Repetition turns into perfection which translates to success, returning us back to
the idea that these narrators take great comfort in knowledge. This knowledge creates confidence
within the narrators, but also a sense of superiority, which in turn, isolates them from the world
around them—or in the case of Bernhard’s narrator and Garcia Madero, their desired world of
art. This isolation extends to the reader, as well, creating a literature that isolates. Regardless of
the narrator’s intentions when inserting “I thought,” or doubling over on their previous
statements, qualifying them with doubts, the insertions function toward disjointedness. They act
as delay on the level of the sentence, they interrupt our reading of the novel, our uncovering of
the plot. For example, when Garcia Madero runs into the bathroom after being interrupted from

is readily apparent: a narrator who quotes his past thoughts runs the risk that the reader will mistake them
for his present—since the basic grammar—tense time, first person—is the same in both cases). This
danger is greatest when past thoughts are detached from the immediate context.” From Cohn, Dorrit.
Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction. Princeton University
Press, 2011, pp. 162.
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his sexual experience with Brígida, he hears someone call out his name and sees, “two pairs of
bright eyes were watching me, like the eyes of wolves in a gale (poetic license: I’ve never seen a
wolf; I have seen gales, though and they didn’t really go with the mantle of smoke that
enveloped the two strangers)” (Bolaño 18).
Unlike Bernhard’s narrator, this insertion seems comical—but only to a degree. Garcia
Madero holds the reader in suspense; who has called out his name? Who is watching him
through the smoke? However, Garcia Madero does not seem to be purposely creating tension and
delay. He is instead taking the time to explain his use of simile, and how it does not exactly
describe the scene before him. Literature takes for granted the use of poetic license when
describing things, poetic license falls under a type of commonplace narrative distortion.
However, the qualifying statement that Garcia Madero includes doubles this sense of comedy.
Perhaps it is a joke, then, that narratives take themselves so seriously that they would use a
simile such as Garcia Madero has used to describe two men getting high in the bathroom of a
bar, surrounded by a cloud of marijuana smoke, laughing at Garcia Madero because his penis is
hanging out. All three novels take the notion of erudition to their logical extreme, into an
unsettling state of absurdity, with The Third Policeman dismantling the principles of intelligence
altogether. This absurdity persists because of the narrators; they are each trapped by their refusal
to fall into the thoughtlessness of ordinary, everyday life.
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Conclusion
Of the critics who have written extensively on Bolaño, I will mention two: Jonathan Beck
Monroe and Chris Andrews, both who work to situate all of Bolaño’s works within a critical
interpretive context with each other, seeking a deeper integrated meaning. Monroe’s text,
Framing Roberto Bolaño: Poetry, Fiction, Literary History, Politics, works chronologically
through Bolaño’s novels from Antwerp (Amberes) to 2666. In a lecture he gave at Cornell
University in 2020, he expanded on his idea of reading Bolaño’s novels as prose-poem novels,
following a hunch, as many critics have, that Poe, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud were integral to
Bolaño throughout his career, even comparing his first “novel” Antwerp (which is a collection of
prose poems) to Paris Spleen (Petits Poèmes en prose). Monroe’s criticism aims to communicate
the way in which Bolaño, taking the ideas of Baudelaire one step further, creates the prose-poem
novel, a structure that overturns the form and scale of poetry and explodes conventional ideas of
a binary separation between poetry and prose. Monroe, particularly regarding the interviews of
Part II, notes that The Savage Detectives was a breakthrough in the terms of prose-poem novel.
The interviews, acting as autonomous, self-contained prose poems—much like “The Part about
the Crimes” in 2666,15 espouse a Rimbaudian difficulty of access and the brevity and intensity of
prose poems first advocated by Poe in “The Philosophy of Composition” (Monroe points out the
irony that this new genre is perhaps an oxymoronic combination of motifs).

15

2666’s “The Part about the Crimes” reads, as Monroe says in his lecture, almost like a collection of obituaries as it
chronicles the murders of 112 women in Santa Teresa from 1993-1997. Monroe also points out that Baudelaire’s
invention of the prose-poem overlaps with the conception of newspapers, to which prose-poems owe much of their
form—reading like fait divers, or even like obituaries in newspapers, he says.
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His chapter “Dismantling Narrative Drive,” the only chapter about The Savage
Detectives, describes the novel as challenging the generic conventions of the detective novel, as
well as a narrative drive toward linearity through the formal structure of prose-poem (which is
perhaps itself a formless form). The disruptions to narrative drive, mostly illustrated in Part II
through a continual and relentless postponing, create “an impossibly sustained assemblage of
loosely linked prose poems on an ‘epic,’ ‘novelistic’ scale” (Monroe 107). For Bolaño, Monroe
notes, the prose poems of Baudelaire and Poe represent a challenge to “traditional realist novel’s
singular, linear drive,” with The Savage Detectives resulting in a novel that collapses the
conventions of the literary and the non-literary, a detective novel that “is in this sense about the
death, or murder, of poetry, if also a case for poetry’s survival, a case in which poetry has also, in
and through the work of the novel itself, an afterlife, a place where it survives and thrives” (116).
I can align myself with Monroe on the basis that we can view The Savage Detectives as
collapsing notions of literary and non-literary, the two permeating each other, and I particularly
agree with Monroe’s idea that the true climactic event of the novel is not finding Cesárea (when,
in fact, there was “nothing poetic about her” (Bolaño 639)), but the revelation of her poem
“Síon.” He expands on Belano and Lima’s conversations with Amadeo about the poem,
What is most striking and consequential for the novel’s revisioning of poetry’s capacities
is above all its serious playfulness, and playful seriousness, in entertaining such
questions. […] The arc of the prose poem novel’s drive into the Sonora Desert in search
of Tinajero that structures Part III may be said to encompass a death drive (una pulsión
de muerte; Freud’s Todestrieb), a death plot (una trama de muerte), and a death trauma
(un trauma de muerte) that figure, like Salvatierra’s name, a certain death of poetry, or
rather the death of a certain view or kind of poetry, on which poetry’s salvation depends.
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At the heart of this salvation is humor, the capacity for poetry not to take itself too
seriously (120).
Monroe postures something akin to a singular, or even allegorical, explanation for the
heteroglossic, polyphonic, relentlessly delaying detective novel in his analysis of Bolaño’s
works—all seen as experiments in prose-poem novel writing.
However, his argument finds its limitations in the idea that the revisioning of poetry’s
capacities is a playful, humorous, endeavor. Here I would like to return to my idea of the
isolating absurdity of erudition (or what Monroe would call “the literary”). Monroe suggests in
his analysis that traditional or “literary” poetry must die, and will be salvaged by a new blend of
prose-poetry that rejects seriousness. I mention in my own analysis that the game Belano and
Lima play with Amadeo, deciphering the meaning behind the title “Síon,” signals the absurdity
of literature that willfully inflates its power or takes itself too seriously. Yet even as Belano and
Lima tell Amadeo the poem is a joke, the context does not feel like a very comic moment.
Consider the dread felt by Amadeo after learning the poem is a joke, when he cannot bring
himself to tell the boys that their explanation had “taken a weight off [his] mind.” Studying the
poem for “more than forty years” and discovering that it was always a joke only drives Amadeo
to another glass of tequila. After a while, the boys begin to ask him what happened to the rest of
the people he and Cesárea knew, to which he replies,
We didn’t realize, but in those days everything was sliding inexorably toward the edge of
a cliff. Or maybe that’s putting it too strongly. In those days we were all sliding downhill.
And no one would try to make the climb back up again, except maybe Manuel, in his
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own way, but otherwise no one else. Miserable goddamn life, isn’t it, boys? (Bolaño
486).
This sense of sliding toward the edge of a cliff certainly signals the drive toward the death of
“literary poetry,” as Monroe points out. However, Monroe wishes to view this “cliff” that
Amadeo describes as the Dover Cliffs of King Lear, wherein a pretend fall over the edge gives
Gloucester back his life, and reunites him with son, all functioning toward the resolution of the
play. Yet for Amadeo the metaphorical cliff is the end of poetry as he knows it, and the end of
his literary existence. Before he gives them Cesárea’s poem, he sends the boys to the store to buy
Los Suicidas tequila, perhaps knowing that by letting the boys in, by letting them see Cesárea’s
poem and possibly explaining it to him hastens his own metaphorical suicide. Perhaps Amadeo
knew already that Cesárea’s poem might be nothing more than an absurd collection of lines on a
page, in which to stake his belief, but was unable to realize it until Belano and Lima came to tell
him.
What he knows now, after hearing that it was always a joke, is that life is “miserable”,
“art is crazy,” and he is simply alone—isolated. Where Monroe wishes to regard this moment as
a hopeful and playful example of poetry on the precipice of immense change, Amadeo can only
see it as a catastrophic ending. Consider, as well, the tense moments where the boys continue
reading what Amadeo now calls “Cesárea’s wretched magazine,” where he starts to view the
boys as “psychotic,” “goddamn psychotic boys! As if speaking in one’s sleep were nothing! As if
making promises in one’s sleep were nothing!” (Bolaño 588). This new tension between him and
the boys, this new dislike of Cesárea’s magazine and his presence in their house stems from their
nonchalance at ruining Amadeo’s view of poetry (and of Cesárea herself)—as if it were nothing
(although here he is referring to the strange way that one of the boys seems to be talking in his
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sleep, behaving like a ventriloquist; still the disruptive idea holds and takes root). Amadeo’s
disappointment and distress in this moment weighs on him much like it does on the narrator of
The Loser, where Bernhard’s narrator finds that, after fifty years of pursuing an art that continues
to elude him, it is better to give up.
Of course, linking Amadeo’s discovered disappointment with the cynical and pessimistic
moment of The Loser argues that all these three novels, when read against each other,
contextualize and reify the obvious and latent absurdity of high seriousness. But the joke that is
Cesárea’s poem still results in isolation in more ways than one. The humor of the novel, whose
existence I do not deny, does not seem to me to be found in these moments of endings and
beginnings. Consider further Monroe’s analysis of the language game Garcia Madero, Belano,
Lima, and Lupe play in the car driving through the Sonora Desert,
Transformed from a source of tragi-comic humiliation (tragic for him, comic for the
reader), in the context of their search for the forgotten poet Tinajero and her poetry, into a
running gag, improvisational comedy routine, the inside joke of Garcia Madero’s
precocious poet-apprentice knowledge, as shared with the four protagonists in the car
speeding through the Sonora Desert, is no longer at García Madero’s or any other
characters’ expense, but a source of joy they share within the fictional frame, the
literal/figurative “vehicle” of their experiences, which the novel shares as well with its
readers (Monroe 121).
Monroe here seems to dispel the notion that any reader would identify with Garcia Madero in
these moments, that we would find his categorical knowledge of ancient poetic forms a joke on
any occasion. They certainly seem comical at the beginning of the novel when he accuses his
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poetry professor of not knowing what a rispetto is, but that comedy came from his self-conscious
undercutting of his own narrative— for example, where he retrospectively inserts, “I don’t know
what I was thinking. The only Mexican poet who knows things like that by heart is Octavio Paz
(our great enemy)” (Bolaño 4). The comedy early in the narrative comes from Garcia Madero’s
forceful but ineffective attempts to align himself with visceral realism, to turn his back on his
own definitions of true poetry in a sort of childish attempt (although we know that he was not
truly able to let go of them, considering his reading of “The Vampire”). The language game
Garcia Madero plays in the car is considerably different, less humorous, and the assertion that a
reader separates themselves from our narrator’s point of view to find an outside perspective on
humor to be false to our reading experience.
Monroe’s distorted sense of what is comic in the novel includes a large portion of the
language game played in the car in Part III,
What is a tetrastich?’
‘What?’ said Lupe beside me.
‘A metrical system of four verses,’ said Belano.
‘And a syncope?’
‘Oh, Jesus,’ said Lima.
‘I don’t know,’ said Belano. ‘Something syncopated?’
‘Cold, cold. Do you give up?’ (Bolaño 592).
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While Belano and Lima are somewhat able to join in the game, Lupe remains isolated. When
Lupe says to Garcia Madero that all the words “sound like Arabic” to her, he laughs, “and when I
had stopped laughing I told Lupe that I wasn’t laughing at her or her ignorance (or lack of
sophistication) but at all of us” (593). The idea that this game is a “source of joy” for all four of
them to join in ignores the foundation of Garcia Madero’s character, as well as his words.
Though he may say that he is laughing at all of them together, he still points out (probably not to
Lupe, and just to the reader of his journal) that Lupe’s inability to participate stems from a lack
of sophistication, demonstrating that Garcia Madero does not surrender his opinions on “true”
poetry (the “literary”) so easily. He unconsciously clings to these values, even when they isolate
him, like when Lupe and Belano say to him, “you know a lot” (593). Upon hearing this, he is,
“seized by laughter again, laughter that was expelled instantly from the car. Orphan, I thought”
(593). If this game is a moment of togetherness, as Monroe would have us believe, why would
Garcia Madero return to thoughts of himself as an “orphan”? Why would he seize on orphan,
except to expose his isolation, his uneasy separation—certainly not to advance “togetherness.”
Monroe also includes the portion of the language game where Lupe takes over as
questioner, asking about slang terms. She begins by posing the questions to Garcia Madero, “Mr.
Know-it-all,” she calls him (597). She asks him what a “prix” is (“a toke of weed”), and what
“muy carranza” means (“something very old”), but it is Belano and Lima who offer these
answer, not Garcia Madero. He says, “‘let me answer’ […] because all these questions were
really for me” (597). Belano and Lima relent momentarily, but when Garcia Madero finally
responds that he does not know what “lurias” means, Belano, Lima, and Lupe take over again,
with Belano and Lima even asking some of the questions. This portion of the game is played
strictly between Belano, Lima, and Lupe—excluding Garcia Madero altogether. As they reach
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the end of the game, Garcia Madero comments, “for a moment, it seemed impossible to me that
I’d ever made love with a girl like Lupe” (598). For Monroe, this game is
[b]ased not on pedantry but on play, not on exclusion but on togetherness, the combined
games of poetry and poetics, slang and dialect, dismantle the high-low distinction,
combining diverse linguistic repertoires and fields of knowledge of poets and prostitutes,
of academic and non-academic speech genres (Monroe 125).
The text, at this moment, certainly relies on a combination of diverse linguistic repertoires, but
this remains a strictly formal element of the text, perhaps an outside debunking of the high
seriousness of formalism. Garcia Madero’s game excludes Lupe (and often Belano and Lima),
and Lupe’s game excludes Garcia Madero—to the point where he begins to see her as distasteful,
wondering how he ever overlooked her ignorance, her “lack of sophistication.” The togetherness
of these moments is not clear to me, nor would they be clear to a reader who has come to identify
with Garcia Madero over the course of his narrative. Garcia Madero, like Amadeo, like Manuel
Maples Arce, suffers in the in-between space created by the “literary” and the “non-literary,”
suggesting an uncomfortable, isolating, perhaps even violent moment when the “literary” and
“non-literary” attempt to be pushed together.
This isolating feeling extends to the reader, as well, by means of Garcia Madero along
with the many other narrators of Part II (which Monroe’s argument lightly dismisses as playful
expressions of prose-poetics, an experiment), although this is in fact exactly the point of The
Savage Detectives. Monroe’s claim that the novel is a prose-poem novel inspired by the likes of
Poe, Baudelaire, and Rimbaud suggests that the overall form of the novel is trying to break away
from any set forms at all. The alienation felt by the reader throughout this whole novel is
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certainly proof of that, and I would argue that this is where the importance of character,
discounted by Monroe’s claims, enters. The novel seems to suggest, to me at least, that moving
away from traditional “literary” forms to create a new form of literature that embraces both
“literary” and “non-literary” traditions cannot be accomplished by cutting off altogether different
methods of learning, and different forms of knowledge—in fact, we can see how this method
would fail through Garcia Madero, how he quit school, abandoned his family, abandoned his
home, all in the pursuit of a truer understanding of visceral realism. A reading of The Savage
Detectives, like my own, that heavily ponders character form, as well as forms of distortion
within the novel, creates a more open text—one that attempts to extend beyond form, what I
believe to be Bolaño’s goal. Through Garcia Madero, readers can interrogate why, exactly, we
feel confused by the combination of “literary” and “non-literary” language, why we might feel
like “art is crazy” like Amadeo if someone tells us the newest art is canned shit, and why we
might feel alienated as readers by a novel that employs both “literary” and “non-literary” ideas.
Diverging from Monroe’s critical approach, Chris Andrews, a prominent translator of
Bolaño’s works into English, examines in Roberto Bolaño’s Fiction: An Expanding Universe,16
the reception of Bolaño’s fiction in English translation and what he believes to be the key ideas
behind its popularity. He gives seven explanations: Bolaño is an exceptional writer, an American
writer, a translatable writer, a writer who has given rise to a myth, a writer who supplies a lack in

16

Monroe includes a nod to Andrews’ work in his chapter “Dismantling Narrative Drive,” writing, “The
Savage Detectives has led more than any other of Bolaño’s works prior to the posthumous publication of
2666 […] to Bolaño’s canonization, comparable to that of Gabriel García Márquez among writers of the
previous Latin American “Boom,” as the synecdochic writer of his generation, the “expanding universe”
of whose reception, in Chris Andrews’ useful formulation, has come to include a growing sense of his
pivotal importance” (Monroe 105).
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North American fiction, a writer who men like, and a writer who has been misread (Andrews 3).
Each of these explanations results in his overall conclusion that Bolaño’s literary success in
translation is somewhat an “anomalous case.” As Andrews explains, the power behind Bolaño’s
works carves out or invents, “a new position in the literary field,” created not just by disruption
but through “the combining of properties and projects that are generally held to be incompatible”
(7). However, Andrews rejects the idea that Bolaño’s narratives are “poetic prose,” which he
claims is an expression generally used to describe “slow, meditative, richly textured prose,” not
much of which can be found in Bolaño’s works. Instead his training as a postsurrealist poet,
Andrews claims, manifests in “passages of plain, quickly paced narration [that] are interrupted
by bursts of imagery or by lists” (8).
Unlike Monroe, then, Andrews moves away from the poetics of Bolaño’s work and into a
study of the narrative strategies that create Bolaño’s works, as well as the ethical and aesthetic
values that accompany it. Because Andrews’ criticism discusses all of Bolaño’s work as an
“expanding universe,” he does not separate his chapters by novel, as Monroe does. Each of
Bolaño’s novels (and poems, and other collections) become, under his terms, inextricably linked
to one another. His chapter, “Aimlessness,” focuses most closely on The Savage Detectives
where he provides a methodology by which to understand the general aimlessness of Bolaño’s
narratives through an understanding of characters and lives. He begins with a discussion of
“Narrative Identity,” citing Galen Strawson’s challenge to “the universal validity of what he calls
the psychological Narrativity thesis (‘one sees or lives or experiences one’s life as a narrative or
story of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories’) and the ethical Narrativity thesis (‘a
richly Narrative outlook on one’s life is essential to living well, to true or full personhood’) (98).
Instead, Strawson distinguishes two kinds of self-experience: diachronic and episodic.
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Diachronic self-experience, according to Strawson is when “one naturally figures oneself,
considered as a self, as something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the
(further) future” (Andrews 98). Episodic self-experience is when “one does not figure oneself,
considered as a self, as some-thing that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the
(further) future” (98).
This broad, controversial attitude toward self explains for Andrews why Bolaño’s fiction
“is largely populated by aimless characters who are little inclined to see themselves as the
protagonists of life stories” (100). He writes, “for Bolaño, as for Strawson, the Episodic life is
not intrinsically inferior to the Diachronic life. It is equally worthy of fictional treatment, and
there are many natural Episodics among Bolaño’s characters” (100). Indeed, Andrews’ analysis
here goes far in explaining the narrative features of The Savage Detectives, particularly in
relation to the interviews, as well as perhaps in explaining the non-linear chronology of Garcia
Madero’s journal entries. His broad claim within this is that Cesárea Tinajero is represents a
general tendency toward aimlessness in the fiction of Bolaño, “Bolaño’s fiction values an
improvising openness over concentrated striving to attain objectives and to ‘make something of
one’s life’” (Andrews 95). His argument here, recalling Monroe’s position, also perhaps helps to
discover Garcia Madero’s intense feelings of alienation from the visceral realists—Garcia
Madero’s certainly had fixed objectives at the start of the novel, as well as a desire to make
something of his life, in contrast with Belano and Lima who live to wander (as evidenced by the
interviews of Part II). But many philosophers have strongly objected to Galen Strawson’s beliefs
that no human being is responsible for their actions (that there are no restraints on behavior).
Hence, he is applauding and applying an unsubstantiated piece of reasoning (Strawson’s) that
some think fictitious and viewing it as the grounds to explain how unethical fictional behavior of
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Bolaño’s characters imitates controversial, possibly false explanations about what it is to be
human.
The process where Bolaño’s characters appear and reappear, circulating from text to text
(41), is the chapter from Andrews’ text that most closely relates to my thesis. He writes in this
chapter,
When Bolaño renames a character who is recognizably the same, he enriches and
compounds the significance of the character’s names. When he reuses a name for a
character who is discernibly different, he further exploits the single name’s connotative
potential. […] His characters are not strictly constrained by their first versions: they
evolve; their names and properties are allowed to change in response to new fictional
environments. He systematically relaxes the requirement of consistency that Balzac
attempted to meet in The Human Comedy. This gives his fiction-making system a degree
of free play unavailable to writers in a more strictly realist tradition (46).
Interestingly, Andrews’ explanation opens the door for how to read inconsistency in modern
fiction, kicking Forster’s explanation down the road, and perhaps reminds a reader of similar
renaming circumstances appearing in The Third Policeman. The problem, most prominent in
Andrews’ work, but visible in the arguments of Monroe, is that Bolaño’s works become
inextricable from each other. This criticism suggests an isolating quality such that a reader of The
Savage Detectives would not be able to understand the use of characters in The Savage
Detectives alone without understanding the rest of Bolaño’s novels, or that a reader cannot
access the deeper meaning of the novels (which for Monroe is its form) without knowing that the
form of The Unknown University, a collection of Bolaño’s poems, was written from verse to
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prose to verse. The idea that Bolaño’s novels fit together like pieces of a puzzle to create a
universe of their own functions the same way that the use of “literary” language functions in The
Savage Detectives—to isolate others. My reading of Andrews’ criticism may be too harsh, but it
derives from the very feeling of isolation I point out. Imagine my surprise upon finishing the six
hundred or more pages of The Savage Detectives only to have critics tell me I cannot possibly
understand the full meaning of the novel without complete knowledge of the entire Bolaño
canon.
From here, Andrews descends into a discussion of Bolaño’s characters and narratives as
autobiographical. Both Andrews and Monroe agree that Arturo Belano of the The Savage
Detectives, along with a host of other characters perhaps even including Garcia Madero, is
something of a fictional alter-ego for Bolaño. A strange similarity between the work of Bernhard
and Bolaño, particularly between The Loser and The Savage Detectives, exists in that both
novel’s narrative voices can be perceived as autobiographical. Bernhard grew up in Salzburg and
Vienna, studying music like his unnamed narrator, and critics like Monroe and Andrews often
argue that both Garcia Madero and Arturo Belano act as alter egos for Bolaño and his
involvement in Mexico with ultra and radical surrealist practices. Both novels (though Bolaño’s
more than Bernhard’s) devise characters based on real people (people that exist outside of the
narrative—Octavio Paz, Gabriel Marquez, Glenn Gould). Yet, the intersection of literature and
real people and true experiences produces two entirely divergent reactions for these two. The
“real-ness” of the text of The Savage Detectives pushes critics to search for more life-like
mapping, more aspects of reality, more intertextuality (or “metarepresentation” as Andrews calls
it) between the novel and its real/fictional geographical domain. Every reference made by Bolaño
requires that it be deeply embedded into the reality of his life, his relationships, the real Mexico
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in the late 1970s. But The Loser’s “real-ness” only draws the reader and critic deeper into the
text itself. The Glenn Gould of The Loser’s narrative is not the Glenn Gould of real life, despite
the insistence on intimate experiences that attest to us that they are the same person. Bernhard’s
Glenn Gould remains firmly rooted in the pages of the novel, never venturing into known
performances or anecdotal conversations with Yehudi Menuhin, whereas Arturo Belano and
Ulises Lima are, as critics suggest, jumping off the page and pointing us to the novel’s deeper
meaning that must exist elsewhere—perhaps in the life of the author, or the lives of those people
on which their characters are based.
The most common claim among all the critics I have drawn on throughout the thesis to
discuss The Savage Detectives, as well as Jason Berger, Ignacio López-Vicuña, Alberto Medina,
Tania Gentic, and Sarah Pollack, several of whom I will next discuss, is that Arturo Belano and
Ulises Lima are the protagonists of the novel. Now, if Belano and Lima are the protagonists of
The Savage Detectives, then Wertheimer and Glenn Gould are just as likely to be the
protagonists of The Loser—which is why I have a hard time believing such a claim. If the
protagonists of The Savage Detectives are Belano and Lima, what makes it so? Because the
novel is supposedly about them? Wertheimer and Glenn Gould are both dead, yet they appear
more often than Belano and Lima do in Garcia Madero’s journals. Perhaps it is because, as
Andrews suggests, Belano seems an obvious alter-ego for Bolaño, and because Belano appears
in several other of Bolaño’s works. Andrews writes, “seven stories feature Arturo Belano, either
as a first-person narrator involved in the action (‘Enrique Martín,’ ‘The Grub’), or as a main
character in third-person narration (‘Detectives,’ ‘Photos,’ ‘The Old Man of the Mountain,’
‘Death of Ulises,’ and ‘The Days of Chaos’)” (Andrews 47). There are also five third person
stories about a character called B, who could easily be either Belano or Bolaño, not that the two
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are so different, according to Andrews. That Andrews also subscribes to the idea that Belano and
Lima are the protagonists calls into question his earlier claim that Bolaño’s characters often resist
the urge to be the protagonists of their own stories. Are Belano and Lima the protagonists simply
because they refuse to see themselves as protagonists? Why is Garcia Madero not the
protagonist? I do not mean to argue that Garcia Madero is the protagonist simply because he is
the narrator, but it is taxing to read the novel and not assume that the story is about Garcia
Madero’s life.
I would argue that the characters of Belano and Lima convince critics they are the
protagonist solely because Garcia Madero writes them to be so. The Glenn Gould of the
narrator’s mind is inhuman and unattainable, and Wertheimer is weak and nervous. As we know
from the many interviews in Part II of The Savage Detectives, Belano and Lima are also “nothing
special.” Of course, they have had many adventures and met many people, some of whom
describe them with reverence and some of whom simply describe them as dirty weed dealers
with no money, relying on the graces of their friends for food and a place to stay. In Garcia
Madero’s eyes, however, Belano and Lima are great mysterious figures. They are on a true quest
for knowledge, they are leading a poetic movement that will revolutionize all literary culture in
Mexico. Holding these two novels, which are both similar and extremely different, together so
closely reveals, then, something about the way character functions in a text—not as a symptom
of the text itself. Character, in effect, must have the ability to change the course of the novel
itself.
Of the other critics I have mentioned, only Berger, Pollack, and Gentic (who will be
discussed later) attempt to read The Savage Detectives outside the context of Bolaño’s other
works. Berger, in his text “Roberto Bolaño’s Moby Dick: Unflattening Formalism,” uses the
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principles of “visceral realism” to illuminate the ways in which contemporary formal criticism
prefers a surface-level, or aesthetic, engagement with literature. Per the title, Berger does not
read The Savage Detectives entirely on its own, as he invokes Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, but
his argument comes to conclusions like that of Monroe (if not more pointed). He does not claim,
as I do, that the principles of visceral realism present the reader with a sort of literary nonsense,
but considering them as nonsense supports his argument. The pivotal moment of the novel,
according to Berger’s argument, is the revelation of Cesárea’s poem,
In Belano and Lima’s reading, Tinajero’s poem goes much further than Madero’s
observation, early in the novel, that one of the visceral realists’ “poetry-writing tenets is a
momentary disconnection from a certain kind of reality” (Bolaño 10). When Belano and
Lima tell Amadeo that Tinajero’s poem is a “joke … covering up something more
serious,” they mean it quite literally, that the poem qua joke signals other actual realities.
In this way, Tinajero’s poem offers an approach to formalism that recalibrates the
standard relations among form (manifest surface) and content (depth) (Berger 32-3)
Ironically, Berger’s argument seems to suggest that the deeper meaning of the poem (and
perhaps the novel) is beyond what one can see on the page. The nonsensical principles of
visceral realism, then, force one to look beyond any preliminary analyses of the novel. For
example, Belano and Lima’s suggestion that Cesárea’s poem represents a boat upon the sea in
varying types of weather, is not the joke of the poem—it is one of many possible jokes, or many
possible realities for the text to inscribe meaning. Berger’s argument recalls Monroe’s argument
about the combination of the “literary” and the “non-literary” and its effects on the text. Though
Berger does not argue using these specific terms, the privileging of an aesthetic reading of novels
certainly falls under the “literary.” However, Berger’s analysis here shifts toward my argument
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about the novel’s purposeful discomfort upon the combination of the “literary” and the “nonliterary,” as he does not claim a joyous union between the two.
On the other hand, Sarah Pollack, in “Latin America Translated (Again): Roberto
Bolaño's The Savage Detectives in the United States,” finds similarity with Andrews in that she
discusses the reception of Bolaño’s novel in English translation, though arguing further that the
success of The Savage Detectives suggests a reconfiguration of the “U.S. reader’s” definition of
Latin American Literature. Interestingly, she notes that Garcia Madero’s escape to the Sonora
Desert with Belano, Lima, and Lupe, “which occupy less than a third of the novel, constitute its
closest approximation of a plot and seem to be the aspect of the book that holds the greatest
appeal for most U.S. readers” (Pollack 359). Pollack here makes a very culture-centered
argument, which I leave out of my thesis although it may hold value. From Pollack and Berger,
we can reconsider Figlerowicz’s notion that flat protagonists, and the literature that contains
them, can teach us something about ourselves.
As evidence by the works of these critics, my methodological approach throughout this
thesis leaves many other methods untouched. For example, there is a notable absence of women
in The Loser and The Third Policeman, and though there are women in Garcia Madero’s
narratives they take a backseat to the stories of Belano, Lima, and other men revered by the
visceral realists. The women throughout the interviews in Part II of The Savage Detectives are
often ex-lovers of Belano or Lima, which becomes the focus of their interviews rather than
anything else about them. Of course, the fact that the interviews center on stories of Belano and
Lima alters the content of the women’s interviews, as well as why they would be interviewed at
all. The women who are part of the visceral realist movement are similarly relegated to the
sidelines, as Pancho details when he talks about who noticed the Lee Harvey Oswald magazine,
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“well, other poets, of course, literature students, and the poetry-writing girls who came each
week to the hundred workshops blossoming like flowers in Mexico City” (Bolaño 22). Here
Pancho distinguishes “poets” from “poetry-writing girls,” and later tells Garcia Madero, “‘lift a
stone and you’ll find a girl writing about her little life’” (22). Perhaps Pancho’s comment here
affects Garcia Madero’s subsequent portrayal of women throughout the journal entries due to his
desire to fit in with the visceral realists, as this thesis argues. However, an analysis of The Savage
Detectives driven by gender-theory certainly can be promoted in terms of recognizing outside the
terms of the novel’s ethos a literary world in which the writing of women is less valuable than
the writing of men.
The benefit of reading a novel through the lens of character, however, is that it illustrates
internal coherence of the novel even when a novel ceases to communicate sense or relinquishes
the referents of the ordinary world. The narrative world of The Third Policeman descends rapidly
into nonsense, leaving the narrator and the reader alienated and confused. Reading the novel
through character, then, allows a reader to find a path through what is recalcitrant and often
opaque. Holding the character accountable for his or her words (à la Stanley Cavell) and
understanding the principles that guide these narrators makes even the most nonsensical narrative
coherent. Studying character in the novel is heuristic, then, in the way it teaches a reader how to
solve narrative problems, extending the study of character in a Barthesian way to include voice.
Listening to voice and listening to what character is through their own voices supports my
interpretive claims, and these novels have a heteroglossic multiplicity of voices.
Continuing the previous gender-oriented methodology, another way to read absent
women into The Third Policeman would be through the gendering and feminization of objects,
like what, for example, the narrator says of his bicycle,
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I knew that I liked this bicycle more than I had ever liked any other bicycle, better even
than I had liked some people with two legs. I liked her unassuming competence, her
docility, the simple dignity of her quiet way. She now seemed to rest beneath my friendly
eyes like a tame fowl which will crouch submissively, awaiting with out-hunched wings
the caressing hand. Her saddle seemed to spread invitingly into the most enchanting of all
seats while her two handlebars, floating finely with the wild grace of alighting wings,
beckoned to me to lend my mastery for free and joyful journeyings […] How desirable
her seat was, how charming the invitation of her slim encircling handle-arms, how
unaccountably competent and reassuring her pump resting warmly against her rear thigh
(O’Brien 170-1).
A critic from outside the time of The Third Policeman recognizes a strong sense of feminine
representation through the bicycle, particularly through the attachment of female pronouns in this
lyrical, almost poetry-like description. Not only is O’Brien feminizing the bicycle, but he is also
sexualizing the bicycle as “desirable,” “charming,” offering up her “spreading saddle.” If we take
this bicycle to be a substitute for a woman, which in this imaginative construction it obviously is,
then the narrative even further suppresses women by stereotyping them as docile and submissive,
viewing them as a tool to be used by men.
Taking an entirely different approach to nonsense language in the works of Bernhard,
Jacob Haubenreich writes in “‘Das Problem liegt im Wie’: Reading Thomas Bernhard Writing,”
composed of rambling, repetitive, rhythmic clauses that can proceed for multiple pages
without pause, Bernhard's writing defies typical narrative conventions and destabilizes
the linguistic structures of thought through which reality is constructed. Bernhard's
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textual deluges become at times so overwhelming, so nonsensical, that the reader can lose
track of what the text is even ‘about’ (Haubenreich 59).
His descriptive methodology takes its cue from Bernhard’s own acknowledgement that he sees
the subject matter proper as entirely secondary. . . .To come back to how I write my
books: I would say, it’s a question of rhythm and has a lot to do with music. Yes, one can
only understand what I write when one realizes that the musical components matter first
and foremost, and that what I narrate only comes second (59).17
Haubenreich takes Bernhard’s comment as instructions of what a reader should see and
understand when reading his novels, using it to chart a way through the destabilized linguistic
structures. His claim implies that my thesis violates the first order of paying attention to the
novel, but curiously even the voice of Bernhard himself echoes his narrator in The Loser,
separating music and words and insisting that the way to understand this novel comes from a
specific understanding of music that must be achieved first. Where Haubenreich critically
responds in kind to Bernhard’s words, I take Bernhard’s voice as guidance, even though
approaching the narrative through authorial intent was not dominant in my analysis.
Tania Gentic, in her article “Realism, the Avant-Garde, and the Politics of Reading in
Roberto Bolaño's The Savage Detectives,” takes the study of mimesis to another level, past just
the consideration that Belano may be an alter-ego for Bolaño himself. She argues that the novel
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Jean-Louis de Rambures, "Aus zwei Interviews mit Thomas Bernhard," in Antiautobiografie.
Zu Thomas Bernhards 'Auslöschung,' ed. Hans Höller and Irene Heidelberger-Leonard
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 13–14. All translations by the author.

98

employs a mode of realism that calls attention to the line between “the real” and “the literary”
through the novel’s use of real people as characters. She writes,
within the narrative Cesárea is an almost mythical figure who has been forgotten by the
literary establishment but who is the proclaimed muse of the real visceralistas. At the
same time, she is narratively tied to an extratextual and historicized reality defined by the
multiple estridentista (Stridentist), surrealist, and Dadaist writers, painters, and poets who
are invoked by the novel's characters as interlocutors. Trotsky's great-granddaughter, the
poet, Verónica Volkow; avant-garde writer Alice B. Toklas; the French electric poet
Michel Bulteau; and Mexican poet Manuel Maples Arce, the founder of the estridentista
movement, among others, are all mentioned and at times given voice in the novel. One
fellow poet of Cesárea's who claims to have spoken with Belano and Lima even suggests
that in her first and only edition of the journal Caborca, Cesárea Tinajero had published
works by Maples Arces, Arqueles Vela, Salvador Novo, André Breton, and other known
avant-garde artists, as though the fictional characters Bolaño invents inhabited the same
plane of reality as these historical literary figures did (Gentic 401)
Gentic’s analysis centers on peopling the novel with the real-life figures of the fictionalized
beings, delving into their mentions as representative of the reality of the avant-garde Latin
American movement. Using realism rather than an “avant-garde literary sensibility,” her reading
situates the novel in a mimetic reality, rejecting the notion that The Savage Detectives employs
tactics of other postmodern, “antirealist” narratives (401). Gentic’s understanding of Cesárea as a
mythical being tied to extratextual and historicized literary movements is very separated from the
way this thesis construes Cesárea, where she is foremost a character in the mundane setting in
which she appears, and not tying her to abstract notions of “high artistry” or presenting her as an
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evocative spirit of surrealist poetic movements. This neither claims that Cesárea is empty, nor are
the rest of the characters whose names attach to real literary figures, but a character-oriented
analysis recognizes the elasticity of character within the novel itself, noting that the fictitious
versions of these people do not have a very strong connection to their external referents. I instead
read the mundane representations of these artists, as they appear within the novel—through the
eyes of Garcia Madero, or from their own fictionalized mouths.
This thesis does recognize that explanation itself is a complex idea as it applies to
literature, particularly considering the criticism of Gentic, Haubenreich, and the possible genderoriented reading of both The Third Policeman and The Savage Detectives. All three of these
methodologies willfully distort in ways that emulate how criticism itself is the very cauldron of
distortion. These critics distort and exaggerate isolated moments of the text that do not
necessarily encompass the experience of what it is to read intuitively, or to through-read a
character in a novel. Reading these novels within the bounds of character takes on the totality of
narrative space and treats it as a guide for interpretation, rather than looking for repeatability and
evidence of isolated instances. This thesis sees voice as an analytic for organization, both
examining the changing voice of character and the consistent voice of character toward an idea
of coherence. Managing character in this way does not aim to tame the unbridled postmodern
text, but in effect, reorganizes and rethinks these novels through readerly memory of narrative
that brings into it critical visibility.
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